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DARE YOU SUE THE TAX COLLECTOR? AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS
AGAINST TAX AGENCIES IN CHINA
Ji Li †
Abstract: Though taxes are as certain as death, each year tens of thousands of
people in the United States go to court to challenge their assessed tax liabilities, and
many succeed. By contrast, very few Chinese taxpayers litigate against tax agencies, and
most of those who sue eventually settle, despite low formal litigation costs. China’s nonlitigious culture does not fully explain the reluctance to sue, as courts in Taiwan
adjudicate five times more lawsuits against tax agencies. Judicial bias favoring
government officials, weak enforcement of judgments against the state, and agency
retaliation help to explain the aversion to litigate disputes with tax agencies in China.
However, once the reluctance to sue is explained, the small amount of cases that go to
trial constitutes a more intriguing puzzle. Why would anyone in China insist on judicial
resolution of disputes with powerful tax agencies, given the adverse conditions that have
deterred hundreds of thousands of others from doing so? This article offers a number of
theoretical explanations that take into account the political and institutional context for
both administrative litigation and tax administration in China. People are more inclined
to sue a tax agency when they have limited extractable resources, powerful allies in
government, substantial interests in the dispute without alternative resolutions, or no
expectation to interact with the agency in the future. These explanations are evaluated
and substantiated with an empirical analysis of all tax-related administrative lawsuits that
went to trial from 2009 to 2011 in Henan Province, one of the most populous provinces
in China. These findings will contribute to the literature on Chinese tax administration,
administrative litigation in China, and extant trial selection theories.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Benjamin Franklin once said that only two things are certain in life:
death and taxes.1 Apparently not all agree. Each year tens of thousands of
taxpayers in the United States go to court to challenge their assessed tax
liabilities, and many succeed. For example, more than 20,000 cases were
filed at the U.S. Tax Court in 2003 against the Internal Revenue Service.2
Around the same time period, more than seven thousand cases were filed at
†
Assistant Professor, Rutgers Law School-Newark. The author thanks Susan Rose-Ackerman, Wei
Cui, Yan Xu, Benjamin Liebman, Richard Cullen, Eric Ip, Eva Pils, Carl Minzner, Margaret Lewis, TajaNia Henderson, John Leubsdorf, Stuart Deutsch, James Pope, Alan Hyde, Chrystin Ondersma, Christina Ho,
Reid Weisbord, and other participants in the seminar at the Center for Rights and Justice of the Chinese
University of Hong Kong, the Colloquium at Rutgers Law School-Newark, and the Chinese law seminar at
Seton Hall Law School. The author may be contacted at jli@kinoy.rutgers.edu.
1
BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (Nathan Haskell Dole ed., 10th ed. 1919).
2
Donald E. Tidrick, Inside the U.S. Tax Court: An Interview with the Honorable Judge Juan F.
Vasquez, CPA, U.S. Tax Court, THE CPA J., http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/104/
text/p20.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
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the New Jersey State Tax Court alone to challenge state and property taxes.3
In addition, numerous cases are filed each year at U.S. district courts and the
Federal Court of Claims for federal tax refunds. In China, by contrast, a
total of 405 cases were filed nationwide in 2011 against tax agencies4 and
most of the cases were eventually settled, despite low formal litigation costs.
The reluctance to sue cannot be easily attributed to cultural differences. In
Taiwan, a place sharing the same cultural attitudes towards litigation with
Mainland China, 2520 cases against tax agencies were filed in 2010 at three
regional high courts, six times that of the Mainland China, 5 whose
population of roughly 1.3 billion dwarfs the approximately 23 million people
living in Taiwan.6
A structural analysis of the Chinese judiciary explains the puzzling
reluctance to sue. There is a shared understanding that local courts do not
normally adjudicate administrative lawsuits against government agencies
impartially and judicial bias is presumably more serious when powerful
agencies, such as tax bureaus, are sued. 7 In rare cases where the
complainant manages to obtain a favorable ruling against a defendant tax
agency, he will still face daunting challenges in getting the ruling enforced.
To further complicate the issue, agency retaliation will most likely follow
any successful enforcement of the ruling.8 This article analyzes the high
costs of taxpayer litigation due to the power and discretion enjoyed by
Chinese tax agencies, which result in few people litigating tax disputes in
China.
The cases that go to trial, though small in number, constitute another
intriguing empirical puzzle. Why would anyone insist on judicial resolution
of disputes with powerful tax agencies, given all the adverse conditions that
deter thousands from doing so? This article argues that tax agencies in
China do not enjoy unlimited power. The tax agencies’ jurisdiction is
3
TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE TAX COURT OF
NEW JERSEY, JULY 1, 2004-JUNE 30, 2005, 2 (2005) available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/taxcourt/
acrobatpdf/tca2005.pdf.
4
SUMMARY OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS IN CHINA (2011),
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/201206/P020120628451878418099.xls (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
5
Guoren Zhang, Shuiwu Xingzheng Susong Shenglu Jin 7.6% [Tax-Related Administrative
Litigation Win Rate Only 7.6%], COMMERCIAL TIMES, (Oct. 15, 2010) http://www.deloitte.
com/view/tc_TW/tw/pressroom/41939/2fa3d084af9a8210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm .
6
See CIA, China, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ch.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) and CIA, Taiwan, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013) for
the population figures of China and Taiwan, respectively.
7
Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China,
51 THE CHINA J. 75, 75-76 (2004).
8
Id. at 90.
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territorial and their power is checked by other agencies of the state.
Therefore, some taxpayers may avoid the heavy losses of agency retaliation
if they expect only a one-time interaction with a tax agency, lack extractable
resources, or have powerful allies in the local state. For these taxpayers,
administrative litigation is less costly and may be pursued if substantial
interests are at stake and alternatives to litigation are unavailable. In
addition, as in the resolution of all disputes, high transaction costs and
optimism may also contribute to the pursuit of administrative lawsuits
against tax agencies in China.
This article evaluates and substantiates these arguments with an
empirical analysis of all tax-related administrative lawsuits that went to trial
from 2009 to 2011 in Henan Province, one of the most populous provinces
in China. As far as the author is aware, this is the first study of Chinese
administrative litigation that contains a substantive analysis of an unbiased
sample of cases.9 The findings contribute to the literature on Chinese tax
administration, administrative litigation in China, and trial selection theories.
The article is divided into eight Parts. Part II provides a brief survey
of Chinese tax law and administration. Part III introduces the institutions for
state control of tax agents in China. Part IV describes the puzzles about taxrelated administrative litigation and relevant literature. Part V argues that
factors such as limited extractable resources, the limited jurisdiction of tax
agencies, substantial taxpayer interests, and lack of future interaction with a
tax agency explain the puzzling persistence of tax litigation that goes to trial.
Part VI evaluates and illustrates this argument by analyzing a dataset
comprised of all tax-related administrative lawsuits from Henan Province
(2009-2011). Part VII discusses how the findings of this article contribute to
existing literature. Part VIII concludes by acknowledging the limitations of
this study and making suggestions for future research.
9

For a sample of empirical research that discusses administrative litigation rates or plaintiff win
rates, see Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come out Ahead in Shanghai Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 120 (2013); Ji Li, Suing the Leviathan—an Empirical Analysis of the Changing Rate of
Administrative Litigation in China, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2013); Minxin Pei, Citizens v.
Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152 THE CHINA Q. 832 (1997); Haibo He, 困顿的行政诉
讼 [Administrative Litigation in Trouble], 华东政法大学学报 [J. OF E. CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. & LAW] 86
(2012). For a sample of research that contains substantive analysis of a selected sample of administrative
cases, see O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, supra note 7; Qinghua Wang, Zhongguo Xingzheng Susong:
Duozhongxin Zhuyi De Sifa [Administrative Litigation in China: Polycentric Adjudication], 19 ZHONGWAI
FAXUE [PEKING U. L. J.] 513 (2007). For a sample of research that uses large-scale surveys to explore
administrative litigation in China, see Jinhua Cheng, Institutional Options for the Settlement of
Administrative Disputes in China: From the Perspective of Public Demand, SOC. SCI. IN CHINA 5 (2010);
Pierre Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: Evidence from Survey Data, in RULE BY
LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds.,
2008).
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II.

Taxation is essential to the survival of any political regime, especially
those of the managerial type. The Chinese government, in order to provide
basic public goods and achieve its policy objectives, established a wide
variety of extractive institutions.10 This article focuses on the institutions for
tax administration. The state currently levies taxes on nineteen major
categories.11 Since the tax reform of 1994, the extractive capacity of the
central government has strengthened to the extent that it achieved an annual
revenue growth of approximately 20% for the last decade, almost twice the
rate of China’s GDP growth for the same period.12
For purposes of maintaining political legitimacy, the nineteen taxes
currently levied contain a number of progressive elements. For instance, the
People’s Republic of China (“P.R.C.”) Law on Individual Income Taxation
sets the rate for the highest income bracket at 45%, much higher than the 3%
rate for the lowest income bracket. 13 A recent amendment of the law
exempts taxpayers with salary income of less than RMB 3500 from paying
any income tax.14 Though the value-added tax (“VAT”) that accounts for a
quarter of total government revenues is a regressive tax, the state has
attempted to ameliorate its wealth effects on low-income individuals by, for
example, reducing the VAT rates for household necessities.15
The progressive elements, however, coexist with features that reflect
the state’s efforts to garner support from constituencies of vested interests.
For instance, the state does not levy any estate taxes.16 In addition, selected
local governments only recently began to experiment with the collection of
10
One important institution is the property regime, which provides that urban land is owned by the
state. XIANFA art. X (1982). Local governments in China have relied heavily on leasing of land use right
to enrich their coffers. See, e.g., Guining Yue, Lili Teng & Chunhua Wang, 我国地方政府“土地财政”问
题研究[Research on Local Governments’ “Land Finance” Problem], 144 开放导报[CHINA OPENING
HERALD] 47, 48 (2009).
11
The nineteen taxes include corporate income tax, individual income tax, value added tax, business
tax, consumption tax, land appreciation tax, real estate tax, arable land occupation tax, urban land-use tax,
stamp tax, custom duties, deed tax, vehicle acquisition tax, vehicle and vessel tax, resource tax, urban
construction and maintenance tax, vessel tonnage tax and tobacco tax.
12
STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, CHINA TAXATION YEARBOOK (2011).
13

Chart for Marginal Tax Rates, 中华人民共和国个人所得税法[P.R.C. Law on Individual Income
Taxation] (on file with author).
14
Id. at art. 6, §1.
15
Yan Xu, Putting the 'Value Added' in China's Vat, 58 TAX NOTES INT'L 487, 490 (2010).
16
Shumin Guo, 遗产税应该尽快出台[For Immediate Enactment of Estate Tax], 中国房地产金融
[CHINA REAL EST. FIN.] 2 (2012).
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real property taxes.17 Such tax benefits for the privileged contribute to the
fast-growing wealth gap in China.18
Figure 1: Amount of several major taxes (RMB billion) collected in
2010.
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Data source: China Statistical Yearbook (2011).

In the past three decades, the state constructed a powerful and rather
sophisticated institutional apparatus for tax administration. By the end of
2010, tax bureaus of all levels employed more than 755,000 full-time and
105,000 part-time agents.19 China is geographically administered, and the
central government shares political power with regional governments. The
17

Jing Zhang & Shuhui Huang, 房产税试点年内将扩容：地方草案加密上报[Experimentation
with Property Taxes Will Expand by Year End: Local Governments Submit Drafts], 第一财经日报 [FIRST
FIN. DAILY] (May 27, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-05/27/c_124766628.htm.
18
The government refused to release the GINI coefficient, a statistical measure widely used to gauge
wealth gap in a region. A 2005 study by the social science academy found the GINI coefficient to be 0.47
(coefficients below 0.4 are generally considered reasonable level of wealth disparity). See generally Xuyan
Fang & Lea
Yu, Gov't Refuses to Release Gini Coefficient, CAIXINONLINE (Jan. 18, 2012)
http://english.caixin.com/2012-01-18/100349814.html. A recent study done by the Xinan University of
Economics and Finance shows the GINI coefficient of 2010 to be 0.61, an extraordinarily high level.
Survey said China in 2010 far exceeded the world average income gap, CAIXINONLINE (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://china.caixin.com/2012-12-10/100470254.html.
19
See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU GANBU DUIWU JIANSHE [DEVELOPMENT OF
TAX ADMINISTRATION STAFF], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897218/
11901216.html (last visited October 14, 2013).
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structure of the tax administration reflects that institutional arrangement.
Among full-time tax agents, nearly half (357,000 by the end of 2010) work
for tax agencies of regional governments.20
As illustrated in Figure 2 below, the central government established a
hierarchical ordering of tax administration. Under the leadership of the
national State Taxation Bureau (“STB”), offices were set up at the
provincial, municipal, district, and county levels, in order of decreasing
rank. 21 Parallel to the STB structure, each province also established a
vertical ordering of tax administration, the Local Tax Bureau (“LTB”), with
a provincial office at the top, subject to dual leadership of the STB and the
provincial government. 22 The former provides professional guidance and
inter-provincial coordination and supervision, while the latter exercises
direct leadership.23 Under the provincial bureau of the LTB are municipal
and prefectural offices, which are of the same official rank, and the county
LTB offices.24 These sub-provincial LTBs are subject to dual leadership of
the higher ranking tax bureaus and the corresponding local governments,
with the latter playing the primary supervisory and leadership role.25 Most
of the tax bureaus set up outposts, branches, offices, information centers, and
other specialized entities to assist in tax administration. 26 By the end of
2010, the STB system contained 3556 tax bureaus at various levels of
administration, and 3414 inspection bureaus and direct branches, 10,193
outposts and tax offices, and 4346 information centers and service centers.27
Similarly, the LTB system consisted of 3055 regional tax bureaus at various
levels of administration, 5186 investigation bureaus and direct branches,
16,373 outposts and tax offices, and 2190 information centers and service
centers. 28 Through such an extensive network of tax agents, the state
20
See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION (2012),
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n6669073/n6669133/6886063.html (last visited October 14, 2013).
21
See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU ZUZHI JIGOU [ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF
TAX ADMINISTRATION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897218/
11901206.html (last visited October 14, 2013).
22
Id.
23
Id. To reflect fiscal policy preference favoring Tibet, China established no regional tax bureau in
the region. Id. The STB and the LTB offices collect different types of taxes. Id. The former is responsible
for the collection of the VAT, consumption tax, automobile tax, business tax of certain SOEs, and so on. Id.
The regional tax bureaus collect business tax, corporate tax, personal income tax, etc. Id. Customs is
responsible for collecting tariffs and certain other specific taxes. Id.
24
STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU ZUZHI JIGOU [ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
TAX ADMINISTRATION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n118972181190120
6.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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achieved an annual revenue growth of approximately 20% in the past
decade.29
Figure 2: Structure of the P.R.C. Tax Administration.30
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The state empowers the agents to carry out their duties with a set of
formal laws and regulations. The fundamentals are laid down in the Law of
the P.R.C. Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection. 31 Major
substantive laws include the P.R.C. Law on Individual Income Taxation, the
29

CHINA STATISTICS BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 8-1 (2011).
STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU ZUZHI JIGOU [ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
TAX ADMINISTRATION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897218/1190120
6.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
31
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理
法) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28,
2001, effective May 1, 2001), ch. 1, art. 1-2, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/200508/31/content_146791.htm.
30
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P.R.C. Law on Enterprise Income Taxation, and the P.R.C. Law on Vehicle
and Vessel Taxation. 32 The P.R.C. Law on Legislation allows the State
Council to make regulations regarding taxation not covered by the statutes in
accordance with proper delegation from the National People’s Congress or
its Standing Committee, 33 as well as regulations about statutory
enforcement. 34 It also allocates certain legislative power to government
agencies such as the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) and the STB.35 While the
power to legislate tax regulations was delegated by the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress (“SCNPC”) to the State Council,
departmental rules about the interpretation and implementation of the tax
regulations lack clear legislative delegation.36 As a result, the legality of the
numerous normative rules issued and applied by the STB, the MOF, and the
LTB is debatable. Yet in practice the rules are largely accepted by taxpayers
and tax professionals.37 The sheer volume and complexity of the normative
documents probably contributes to the fact that Chinese taxpayers rely
heavily on personal interpretations by tax agents to comply.38 Recently the
national agencies have begun to rationalize tax rulemaking, especially the
making and enforcement of normative rules.39
III.

CONTROLLING THE TAX AGENTS

In order to collect enough revenue to meet its ever-increasing
spending needs, the state empowers its tax agents and grants them wide
discretion over tax administration. Meanwhile, the state also implements a
number of institutional measures to solve the inherent agency problem
ubiquitous in a political system lacking freedom of press or a democratic
check. For the sake of clarity, the agency-controlled institutions are

32

STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUISHOU ZHIDU DE FALU JICI [THE RANKING OF LAWS
CONCERNING TAX COLLECTION], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n11897113/
11900938.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
33
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Lìfǎ Fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 立 法 法 ) [Law on Legislation]
(promulgated by Ninth National People’s Congress, Third Session, effective March 15, 2000), art. 9
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-01/21/content_699610.htm.
34
Id. at art. 56.
35
Id. at art. 71.
36
Wei Cui, What Is the “Law” in Chinese Tax Administration, 19 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 73, 75 (2011).
37
Wei Cui, Two Paths for Developing Anti-Avoidance Rules in China, 17 ASIA PAC. TAX BULL. 1
(2011).
38
Id. at 2.
39
Id. at 4.
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categorized according to the Ginsburg typology: hierarchy, second-party
supervision, and third-party supervision.40
Mechanisms in the first category, hierarchy, include positive sanctions
(e.g., merit-based bonus and promotion) and negative sanctions (e.g.,
administrative punishment) within the agency, merit-based recruiting,
regular study sessions, and so forth.41 For instance, since 2003 all candidates
applying to work for the STB have been required to pass the highly
competitive National Civil Servant Examination.42
When hierarchical mechanisms fail to prevent, detect, and correct
agency abuses, second-party supervision comes into play. Two powerful
institutions, the Communist Party of China Central Disciplinary Committee
(“CDC”) and the Ministry of Supervision, which are charged with the
responsibility to investigate and punish misconduct by government officials,
are seriously under-staffed. 43 Hence, their supervision is limited to high
ranking government officials and they rarely implicate tax agents at the local
level.44 The procuratorate may also function as an institution for secondparty supervision over tax agents and subject the more abusive ones to
Adopted from former Soviet Union, the
criminal punishment. 45
procuratorate may take the initiative to investigate official misconduct. 46
However, the discretion enjoyed by tax agents renders it difficult to
distinguish routine exercise of discretion from illegal misconduct.
To deal with the information asymmetry problem inherent in secondparty supervision, the state created third-party supervisory institutions that
allow parties with private information about official misconduct to report it
to the government. Two examples are the letter and visit offices and the
administrative reconsideration offices. 47 The former, in spite of its long
40
TOM GINSBURG, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 61-63,
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, eds. 2008).
41
Id. at 61.
42
See STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, SHUIWU GANBU DUIWU JIANSHE [ON DEVELOPING
STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION STAFF], http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/
n8138877/n11897218/11901216.html (last visited July 26, 2013).
43
Jiangnan Zhu, Officials’ Promotion Likelihood and Regional Variation of Corruption in China at
83 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author).
44

See, e.g.,北京地税局原局长王纪平被“双规[Director of Beijing LTB Was Under Shuanggui],
XINHUA (May 6, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-05/06/c_1275967.htm.
45
The institution’s functions include prosecution of crimes and supervision of government and
judicial officials. See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Jiǎnchá fǎ (中华人民共和国检察法) [Law on the
Procuratorate] (promulgated by the Eighth National People’s Congress Standing Committee, Feb. 28, 1995,
effective July 1, 1995), art. 6, http://www.china.com.cn/law/flfg/txt/200608/08/content _7063805.htm.
46
Id.
47
For a thorough description of the letter and visit offices, see Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative
to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (2006).
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history, have proved ineffective in resolving individual grievances.48 The
latter are a relatively new institution.49 The State Council first enacted the
Administrative Reconsideration Regulation (“ARR”) to facilitate the
implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law (“ALL”), a
groundbreaking statute that enabled Chinese citizens to bring government
officials to court.50 The ARR was upgraded to a statute after a few years of
trial implementation. 51 The legislature intended the administrative
reconsideration regime to complement, not substitute, administrative
litigation, so the procedure was designed to be informal, cost-free, and
expedient. 52 Citizens unsatisfied with any concrete administrative action
may file a petition for reconsideration with a supposedly independent body
lodged in the agency or a higher government body.53 Besides the legality of
the challenged administrative act, the reconsideration body may review its
48

Id. at 106.
In a very general sense, the administrative reconsideration mechanism resembles a typical
administrative appeals institution in the United States.
50
For a brief summary of the legislative history, see Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path
Dependency and the Limits of Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic
of China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 161, 191-92 (2001).
51
See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Fùyì Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政复议法) [Law on
Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress Standing
Committee, April 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/200508/21/content_25100.htm.
52
For instance, complainants incur no cost to file a petition for administrative reconsideration.
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Fùyì Fǎ (中华人民共和国行政复议法) [Law on Administrative
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress Standing Committee, April 29,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) at art. 31, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/21/content_25100.htm. In
addition, the reconsideration body is required to respond to a petition within 60 days after its filing. Id.
The filing may be done either in writing or orally, to accommodate those who are illiterate or are not
accustomed to formal written complaints. Id. at art. 11. The procedure was designed to be informal and
flexible.
53
Petitions against bureaus of the STB are handled by the bureau at the next highest level. See
Shuìwù Xíngzhèng Fùyì Guīzé (税务行政复议规则) [Tax Rules for Administrative Reconsideration]
(promulgated by the State Administration of Tax Bureau, Dec. 15, 2009, effective April 1, 2010),
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8138502/9563669.html. Petitions against an
office of the LTB may be filed with either the corresponding local government or the bureau of a higher
rank, unless otherwise stipulated by regional rules. Petitions against the STB in Beijing may be filed with
the bureau itself. Petitions should in general be filed, orally or in writing, within 60 days after knowledge
of the concrete administrative action. Relevant administrative reconsideration body should review a
petition within five days of its filing and decide whether to accept it. Rejection may be based on a limited
number of situations such as nonpayment of the disputed tax liabilities and fines. Once accepted, a petition
should be directed to the responding party, which carries the burden of proof. The administrative
reconsideration body shall conduct investigation and render a decision within 60 days of the acceptance of
the petition. An additional 30 days may be granted if the case is complex. For disputes over the exercise of
discretion by tax agents or matters over the reasonableness of certain administrative action, reconciliation
and mediation are allowed. The reconsideration body may uphold the administrative action, amend it, or
withdraw it after determining its illegality, in which case it should order the responding party to take new
administrative action in accordance with the law. Id.
49
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appropriateness and the legality of relevant agency rules,54 both of which fall
beyond the jurisdiction of typical courts.
Once taxpayers have exhausted administrative recourse for disputes
over a tax matter, they may turn to the courts. 55 The defendant agency
generally bears the burden to prove the challenged administrative action was
carried out in accordance with law. 56 If the court deems the evidence
insufficient, it may conduct its own investigation.57 Under current law, a
judgment or decision must be rendered within three months after the
docketing of an administrative lawsuit, and unsatisfied parties may appeal
the trial decisions to a higher court.58
In sum, the Chinese government has over the years enacted a whole
set of substantive and procedural laws and regulations over tax
administration, and has constructed an administrative law regime to rein in
abusive government officials. Though the resulting legal framework
contains some elements that appear more favorable to tax agencies—e.g.,
payment of the purported tax liability is required for initiating the
administrative reconsideration procedure59—it should provide a reasonable
institutional protection to Chinese citizens against abusive tax agents or
misinterpretation of tax laws and regulations.60
IV.

EMPIRICAL PUZZLES AND EXTANT LITERATURES

While the state has set up a rather comprehensive legal framework to
restrain government agencies and to protect Chinese taxpayers, very few
taxpayers have chosen to use this legal framework.61 According to recent
54

Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu zhēngshōu guǎnlǐ fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理法)
[Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, effective May
1, 2001), art. 35, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm.
55
Id. at art. 88.
56
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 诉 讼 法 )
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 32.
57
Id. at art. 34.
58
Id. at art. 57.
59
Shuìwù Xíngzhèng Fùyì Guīzé ( 税 务 行 政 复 议 规 则 ) [Tax Rules for Administrative
Reconsideration] (promulgated by State Administration of Taxation Dec. 15, 2009, effective April 1, 2010),
ch. 6.
60
Wei Cui, supra note 37, at 5.
61
From 1994 to 2005, courts nationwide received merely 1,399 lawsuits against tax agencies, an
average of 120 cases per year. See Jingjing Chen, Shuiwu Xingzheng Anjian Liunian Fanfan, Nanshuiren
Xiguan Falu Jiuji Shouduan [Administrative Cases Double in Six Years, Taxpayers Used to Legal
Remedies] LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 7, 2007. Another source, however, reports a much larger number (6,154
cases from 1996 to 1999). See HARBIN MUNICIPAL LOCAL TAXATION BUREAU, SHUI WU XINGZHENG FU
VI SHI WU ZHONG DE WENTI VU DUICE (税务行政复议实务中的问题与对策) [ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS IN
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data published by the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), out of 136,353 first
instance administrative lawsuits filed in all Chinese courts in 2011, only 405
were against tax agencies.62 Among the 399 cases that were closed by the
end of the year, 279 were concluded without reaching any substantive issues,
and the courts issued decisions not judgments. Of the 279 decisions, 225
were court approvals for plaintiffs to withdraw their complaints, and twenty
five cases were dismissed without a trial.63 Of the mere 120 cases where
courts rendered judgments on substantive legal issues, defendant tax
agencies prevailed in 106 cases and plaintiffs in only fourteen, a victory rate
of 11.7%.64
To the uninitiated, it must be puzzling that taxpayers in China avoid
judicial resolution of tax disputes to such a great extent. The next part
explains the unusual reluctance to sue. However, the explanations will at the
same time unveil a more intriguing puzzle: why does any tax-related lawsuit
go to trial at all, given all the factors that have turned thousands of taxpayer
disputants away from judicial resolution?
A.

The First Puzzle: Why Are Potential Litigants Reluctant to Sue?

To scholars familiar with administrative litigation in China, reluctance
to sue government agencies is hardly a puzzle. Here it is posed as such
mostly to set up the context for the discussion of the next empirical question:
who, and under what circumstances, sues the tax bureau—arguably one of
the most powerful agencies in China.
When asked to comment on administrative litigation, a Chinese
businessman made the following comment: “It is very unlikely that I will
win a lawsuit against the government. Even if I won in court, I would then
risk losing everything.” 65 This comment reflects a widely-shared
PRACTICE
OF
TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE
RECONSIDERATION]
(Oct.
24,
2008),
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfy/llyj/200811/20081100066707.shtml.
62
SUMMARY OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS IN CHINA (2011),
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfsj/201206/P020120628451878418099.xls (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
63
Id.
64
One source cites the victory rate of all cases filed between 1994 and 2005 to be 45%. See Hong
Lan, Shuiwu Xingzheng Anjianshu Cheng Shangsheng Qushi [Trend of Increase for Tax-Related
Administrative Cases], ZHONGGUO SHUIWU BAO [CHINA TAX'N] (Feb., 5 2007). See also Wei Cui, The
Rule of Law in Chinese Tax Administration, in THE DELICATE BALANCE: TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE
OF LAW 362-63, (Chris Evans, et al., 2011). The STB's high plaintiff victory rate may include cases
withdrawn by the plaintiffs after the defendants had changed their administrative acts. Or it may just be
figures from a few years ago, before the national campaign for ADRs.
65
Qian Wang & Xuena Li, Jie Qiye Er Yu,( 竭企业而渔) [Destroying Tax Basis by Overtaxing
Companies] XIN SHI JI [NEW CENTURY MAG.] (Aug. 27, 2012), http://magazine.caixin.com/2012-0824/100428102.html.
THE
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understanding and explains why most taxpayers choose not to sue tax
agencies when disputes arise. In theory, litigation is a preferred method for
dispute resolution if and only if its benefits outweigh its costs and the net
benefits outweigh those of other alternative dispute resolution methods
(including not doing anything at all). 66
From the viewpoint of welfare maximization, when litigation costs are
high, rational disputants should agree to settle and split the cost savings. In
the United States, expensive legal fees probably deter many from suing.
This deterrence does not directly apply in China because the formal costs for
administrative lawsuits are low. As noted earlier, the administrative law
regime was established in part to encourage information-holders to assist the
state in monitoring local agents. So under current law, the court fee for
filing an administrative case is merely RMB 50 (USD 7.5).67 In addition, the
defendant government agency generally bears the burden of proof in
administrative lawsuits. 68 Finally, relatively low attorneys’ fees make the
assistance of legal counsel affordable to many, though evidence shows that
Chinese lawyers tend to avoid representing cases against the state.69 The low
formal litigation costs in China suggest that the deterrent to suing the state
lies elsewhere.
Judicial weakness and bias favoring state agencies and high costs of
agency retaliation explain the strong reluctance to file lawsuits against tax
agencies in China. Judicial weakness and bias in administrative litigation is
not a new concept to scholars of Chinese law and politics.70 Courts in China
are reluctant to challenge the local officials who control court funding and
major personnel decisions. 71 When adjudicating administrative lawsuits,
pragmatic Chinese judges consider the potential impact of their rulings on
local stability and the compliance costs for the local government. 72 The
tactic often employed is to dodge difficult cases. 73 Because of judicial
66

For the sake of clarity, responses to a grievance against a state agency can be grouped into three
categories: 1) lumping it (bearing the loss without protesting), 2) negotiating a settlement or protesting
through other non-judicial channels, and 3) litigating against the agency.
67
Susongfei Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measures Regarding Payment of Litigation Fee]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 19, 2006, effective April 1, 2007), art. 13, § 5,
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006-12/29/content_483407.htm.
68
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 诉 讼 法 )
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 32.
69
Ji Li, supra note 9, at 22.
70
See Xin He & Yang Su, supra note 9; O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, supra note 7.
71
Benjamin L. Liebman, China's Courts: Restricted Reform, 191 THE CHINA Q. 620, 627 (2007).
72
Qinghua Wang, supra note 9, at 525.
73
Id. at 525-26. See also, Xin He, The Judiciary Pushes Back: Law, Power, and Politics in Chinese
Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (R. P.
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weakness, litigants have to resort to multiple mechanisms, such as media and
mass protest, to pressure judges to accept and adjudicate administrative
lawsuits fairly.74 Of course, not all government agencies are treated equally.
Judges tend to be more inclined to rule in accordance with the law if the
defendant is a weak administrative agency and the unfavorable decision
would not negatively impact its interests.75 In contrast, when a case touches
upon critical interests of powerful administrative agencies, the court will try
to avoid registering the case or ruling against the defendant.76 Even if the
plaintiff manages to obtain a favorable ruling in court, the subsequent
enforcement is at best uncertain. Powerful state agencies face a low risk of
punishment for delaying or refusing to comply with judgments against their
interests.77
In the rare case where the plaintiff in an administrative lawsuit wins in
court and is able to enforce the judgment, agency retaliation will most likely
follow.78 The costs and damages of such retaliation, if from a tax agency, are
substantial. To ensure revenue collection, the state grants local tax agents
wide discretion to implement tax laws and policies. Consequently, disguised
retaliation is of low risk for the agents, but costly for the targeted explaintiff. For instance, a tax agency may retaliate by conducting more
inspections and audits of the taxpayer’s books, causing excessive delays in
processing the taxpayer’s requests, over-assessing taxpayer’s revenues or
profits, and issuing harsh penalties for tax deficiencies.79
Typical business practices in China also contribute to the high costs of
agency retaliation. Formality is not highly valued in small business

Peerenboom ed., 2010). Until recently, local courts could dodge administrative lawsuits by not acting on it.
Rejecting it outright would enable the complainant to appeal the case to a higher court, so the case filing
division could choose not to do anything about a complaint. A recent SPC rule was intended to solve this
problem. Complainants are now allowed to bring a lawsuit directly to a higher court if the first instance
court ignores the filing.
74
See, e.g., O’Brian & Lianjiang Li, supra note 9, at 82.
75
Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, Case Registration Politics and the Stagnation of Administrative Litigation:
An Empirical Study of Two Northern China Basic Courts, 6 TRIB. OF POL. SCI. & L. 111, 117 (2009).
76
Id. at 116-18.
77
See O’Brian & Lianjiang Li, supra note 9, at 90. However, some empirical evidence indicates that
the enforcement of court judgment in civil cases is better than generally expected. See Xin He, Debt
Collection in the Less Developed Regions of China: An Empirical Study from a Basic-Level Court in
Shaanxi Province, 206 THE CHINA Q. 253 (2011).
78
See HARBIN MUNICIPAL LOCAL TAXATION BUREAU, supra note 61.
79
The statute in general stipulates penalties in the range of 50% to 500% of the assessed tax
deficiency, and the agency has the discretion to decide the exact percentage. See Zhōnghuá Rénmín
Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 税 收 征 收 管 理 法 ) [Tax Collection
Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28, 2001, effective May 1,
2001), ch. 1, art. 1-2, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm.
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transactions between Chinese companies. 80 A large number of small
businesses pay presumptive taxes.81 Jeopardizing a cooperative relationship
with a tax agency will presumably result in higher tax assessments. In
addition, many businesses engage in some form of tax evasion.82 A good
relationship with local tax agents ensures that agents ignore the tax evasion.
Such a practice, however, allows tax agencies to easily retaliate against
businesses if the agencies ever choose to strictly enforce relevant tax laws.83
Because the actual tax burden of a Chinese taxpayer depends on his or her
relationship with tax collectors,84 few would jeopardize that relationship by
challenging the collectors in court.
Moreover, most Chinese firms are well aware of the importance of a
good relationship with tax agents and will actively cultivate and maintain
one. An empirical study found that Chinese companies constantly set aside
a significant portion of their business expenses as “money bribes to
government officials in exchange for lower expropriation.” 85 Chinese
companies also engage in frequent personal interactions with local tax
agents to obtain information about tax law enforcement. 86 All these
precautions reduce the probability of disputes arising in the first place.
Systemic reforms aimed at easing social tensions further reduce the
These reforms strengthened
filing of administrative lawsuits. 87
administrative reconsideration institutions and encouraged mediation at
every phase of the litigation procedure.88 Chinese courts even implemented
target responsibility systems to increase the rate of mediation for civil and
administrative litigation. 89 In the context of this national campaign to
promote non-judicial dispute resolution, most of the administrative lawsuits
against tax agencies, once docketed, must be actively mediated by the
courts. If the mediation efforts succeed, the taxpayer will withdraw his
complaint and the case closes. Otherwise, the lawsuit will go to trial. Even
throughout the trial process, the judge will press the parties to settle before
80
See Max Boisot & John Child, From Fiefs to Clans and Network Capitalism: Explaining China's
Emerging Economic Order, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 600, 612-13 (1996).
81
Wei Cui, The Prospect of New Partnership Taxation in China, 46 TAX NOTES INT'L. 625, 630
(2007).
82
See Qian Wang & Xuena Li, supra note 65.
83
Id.
84
Hongbin Cai, et al., Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the
Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms, 54 J.L. & ECON. 55, 63 (2011).
85
Id. at 66.
86
Wei Cui, supra note 37, at 3.
87
See generally, Carl Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011).
88
Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, supra note 75, at 120.
89
Minzner, supra note 87, at 957.

72

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 23 NO. 1

issuing a decision or judgment. 90 Thus, any administrative lawsuit filed
against a tax agency filters through a number of institutions that are designed
to provide non-judicial resolution.
In sum, judicial weakness and bias in favor of the state, high costs of
agency retaliation, and the state campaign to promote alternative dispute
resolutions determine that, when disputes arise between taxpayers and local
tax officials, the former tend to show a high level of tolerance. If any action
is taken, it is likely directed towards non-judicial dispute resolution. As a
result, only a few hundred administrative lawsuits are filed each year against
tax agencies in China.
B.

The Second Puzzle: Why Does Anyone Sue and Insist on a Trial?

Given the state campaign to promote alternative dispute resolution,
judicial bias, and the high cost of agency retaliation, the existence of any
tried cases is an intriguing puzzle. Why does anyone in China go through
the adjudicatory process to resolve disputes with powerful tax agencies,
given the adverse conditions? The answer to this question is of critical
importance to the understanding of tax administration in China, the
development of its administrative law regime, and more generally China’s
legal reform.
Questions about the selection of lawsuits for trial have generated a
vast amount of literature. 91 Assuming litigation is more costly than
settlement, all lawsuits should settle but for transaction costs or information
asymmetry. Further, those lawsuits that go to trial are neither a random nor
a representative sample of all the lawsuits. According to the classic model
developed by Professors George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein (“Priest/Klein
model”), after satisfying certain assumptions, lawsuits will only be tried if
they are “close cases,” and plaintiffs will have approximately a 50% win
rate.92 Systematic deviation from the 50% rate may occur if: 1) litigation
costs are low relative to settlement costs, 2) plaintiffs expect judgments to be
high relative to litigation costs (encouraging litigation for a high proportion

90

Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, supra note 75, at 119.
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984); Donald Whittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A
Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988); Theodore Eisenberg,
Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337
(1990).
92
See Priest & Klein, supra note 91, at 17.
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of disputes), or 3) the two parties have different stakes in the litigation’s
outcome.93
One notable alternative theory, the asymmetric information model,
loosens the implicit assumption of the Priest/Klein model that disputants are
equally informed. 94 Because the disputants hold asymmetric information
and the informed party offers to settle only when it expects to lose at trial,
the informed party should prevail in most tried cases.95 So in contrast to the
Priest/Klein model, the asymmetric information model does not predict a
general tendency of 50% win rate.96 Instead, the more informed party should
have a much higher victory rate.
In the past three decades, the Priest/Klein model and alternative
theories have spawned numerous empirical studies.97 U.S. Tax Court cases
are ideal for testing these theories because the judgments of both settled and
tried civil tax controversy cases are disclosed to the public. One study found
divergent expectations to be a critical factor in determining the likelihood of
settlement, and active judges will facilitate the meeting of such expectations
and minimize strategic behavior by the disputants.98 However, taxpayers’
risk preference and the use of legal counsel show no significant impact on
the settlement of tax court cases.99
Very few empirical studies have touched on why administrative
lawsuits go to trial in China. The most notable study is Professor Pei
Minxin’s article in 1995, which found both parties to an administrative
dispute had incentives to settle.100 According to the study, plaintiffs suing
government officials in China expect to lose and are better off settling with
the defendants.101 The sued government agencies are also threatened by the
small possibility of losing in court, which would harm not only government
authority but, more importantly, the career prospect of responsible
93

Id. at 20.
Id. at 24-29.
Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of
Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451, 452 (1998).
96
See Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493
(1996); Waldfogel, supra note 95.
97
See Daniel Kessler, et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal
Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233(1996); Eisenberg, supra note 91;
Daniel Klerman, The Selection of 13th-Century Disputes for Litigation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320
(2012); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991). Most of these studies use evidence from the
United States.
98
Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 341 (1999).
99
Id.
100
Minxin Pei, supra note 9, at 844.
101
Id.
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officials.102 As a result, defendant government agencies are incentivized to
settle as well.103 In addition, Chinese courts—stuck between the conflicting
interests of maintaining their institutional legitimacy and protecting the
interests of state agencies—are equally enthusiastic about settlement. 104
Given the stakes implicated by non-judicial resolution of administrative
disputes, a significant proportion of plaintiffs in Pei’s empirical study settled
and withdrew their complaints.105 Pei also compared the defendant win rates
in administrative lawsuits against different government agencies and
concluded that powerful agencies enjoy greater advantages in administrative
litigation.106
In reaching this conclusion, Pei neglected the Priest/Klein theory and
failed to address the causes of the deviation from the 50% plaintiff victory
rate. In addition, Pei’s study centered on a sample of 236 administrative
cases that were published in the early 1990s as model precedents for judges
and lawyers, creating a problem of selection bias.107 Moreover, the study
provided a survey of several general attributes of the cases—such as who
were the plaintiffs, who was sued, and who prevailed—without reaching into
the substance and contexts of the lawsuits.108 Therefore, it fails to explain
why a portion of the cases went to trial in spite of all the unfavorable
conditions for administrative litigation recognized in the study.
Other empirical works of administrative litigation in China relied on
either a small number of non-random cases and interviews or a large-scale
social survey. 109 Both methodologies are flawed with the selection bias
problem. And most of the studies cover administrative lawsuits against all
government agencies.110 It is widely recognized that all state agencies are
not equal in the highly fragmented authoritarian regime, with powerful ones
enjoying more advantages in court.111 By treating all government defendants
the same, existing studies miss this important aspect of Chinese politics.
In sum, existing literature does not sufficiently explain why some taxrelated administrative lawsuits reach the trial stage despite the nationwide,
state campaign for settlement, high costs of government retaliation, little
chance of victory, and low possibility of enforcement of any favorable
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 842-45.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 847-48.
Id. at 851.
See sources cited supra note 9.
See sources cited supra note 9.
Xing Ying & Zuo Xu, supra note 75, at 116-18.
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The next part sets out to answer the intriguing empirical

MAKING SENSE OF THE “IRRATIONAL” ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS
AGAINST TAX AGENCIES IN CHINA

This part discusses four main factors that contribute to the trial of
certain lawsuits against powerful tax agencies: 1) immunity to extra-judicial
retaliation; 2) substantial stake and lack of alternative dispute resolution; 3)
high transaction costs; and 4) optimism of the disputants.
As discussed earlier, though formal litigation costs are insignificant in
China, extra-judicial costs, i.e., the costs of agency retaliation, tend to be
substantial for those who take government officials to court, which results in
only a few lawsuits against tax agencies. The critical role of agency
retaliation in deterring lawsuits, however, also explains why complainants
who may avoid the costs will be able to significantly reduce the actual
litigation costs and be more incentivized to sue.
Tax agencies in China, though powerful, are subject to certain
restraints. First, their jurisdiction is territorial.112 A tax agency enjoys wide
discretion in tax administration within its own territory, but crossing the line
into another agency’s jurisdiction significantly curtails this discretion.
Because of this limit on a local tax agency’s power, a complainant may
avoid retaliation costs if she moves her taxable assets away from the
agency’s jurisdiction and does not interact with the agency again after the
lawsuit.
Second, the exercise of local tax agencies’ monitoring,
investigative, and extractive authority and discretion is largely restricted to
taxable income and assets. 113 Therefore, individuals and companies with
low incomes and revenues are relatively immune to the agencies’ retaliation
threats. Third, the authoritarian regime of China is highly fragmented,114 so
having a powerful ally in the political system significantly reduces the
probability of tax agency retaliation.
While retaliation costs may be curbed in these limited circumstances,
persistence in continuing to trial would not exist without an expectation of
high returns. Put differently, a lawsuit will more likely be tried if substantial
112

See supra Part II for a discussion about the system for tax administration in China.
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理
法) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28,
2001, effective May 1, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm.
114
For a detailed discussion of the concept of fragmented authoritarian regime, see KENNETH
LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA : LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES
137-51 (1988).
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interests are at stake and alternative dispute resolution channels are
unavailable. Expectation of positive return depends first of all on a positive
probability of winning a lawsuit. For the following reasons, such positive
probability may exist in spite of the serious judicial bias discussed earlier.
Though plaintiffs of administrative lawsuits are very likely to lose at the trial
level,115 it is possible to win upon appeal. Appellate courts tend to be less
influenced by defendant government agencies.116 Plaintiffs in administrative
lawsuits therefore expect a better chance of obtaining favorable judgments at
the appellate level.
A unique institutional feature of the Chinese legal system, the lack of
judicial finality, further improves the plaintiffs’ chance of obtaining an
eventual victory. Though in general appellate decisions are final, in certain
circumstances they may be further challenged. The procuratorate may lodge
a protest of a legally binding decision to a higher court on numerous
grounds, such as erroneous application of the law by judges.117 For reasons
similar to other second-party supervisory institutions, only a very few
administrative cases are processed by the procuratorate each year.118 Other
possible channels to challenge an appellate decision include directly
petitioning a higher court to intervene and retry the case or petitioning the
deciding appellate court to reopen the case.119 Such intervention is more
likely if the higher court faces external pressure from the legislature, 120
ranking government officials,121 or public media.122 In sum, due to the lack
of adjudicatory finality and the possibility of prevailing when higher
authorities intervene, plaintiffs in a suit against tax agents may try a losing
case and then appeal if substantial interests are at stake. Readers should note
that the discussion of this and the preceding paragraph is only to show that
115

Xin He & Yang Su, supra note 9, at 132.
Minxin Pei, supra note 9, at 847.
117
See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 诉 讼 法 )
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http://www.civilprocedurelaw.cn/html/jcjd_1174_2538.html.
119
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Xíngzhèng Sùsòng Fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 诉 讼 法 )
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 62.
120
See Young Nam Cho, Symbiotic Neighbour or Extra-Court Judge? The Supervision over Courts
by Chinese Local People's Congresses, 176 THE CHINA Q. 1068, 1073-77 (2003).
121
See Liebman, supra note 71, at 626-27.
122
See id. at 628-29.
116

JANUARY 2014

ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS AGAINST TAX AGENCIES IN CHINA

77

the probability of post-trial victory is positive, not zero. As will be
illustrated in the next part, appellate courts rarely reverse lower court
decisions favoring a strong state agency. In other words, the probability of
winning an administrative lawsuit, at trial and afterwards, is positive but
very low, so plaintiffs will insist on trial only if substantial interests are at
stake.
In sum, while the high extra-judicial costs of suing tax agencies
explain the small number of administrative lawsuits filed each year, they
also explain why those that do not bear the costs may persist on going to trial
for a reasonable amount of material rewards. Moreover, substantial stake
and lack of alternative dispute resolution may also explain why some cases
fail to settle. The theoretical explanations specific to China’s political legal
context do not necessarily conflict with general selection theories. High
transaction costs and optimism of the disputants should also contribute to the
filing of lawsuits against tax agencies in China.
The next part examines these theories against the results from
administrative lawsuits against tax agencies in Henan Province from 2009 to
2011.
VI.

ANALYSIS OF TAX-RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS FROM HENAN
PROVINCE

This part evaluates and substantiates the theoretical explanations
proposed in Part V with an analysis of all of the major administrative cases
against tax agencies that went to trial in Henan Province from 2009 to 2011.
The author selected Henan Province for the following reasons. First and
foremost, the province took the lead in publishing court decisions and
judgments. In response to a SPC rule about case disclosure,123 the Henan
123
As part of the judicial reform, the SPC published the Six Rules on the Disclosure of Judgments
and the Measures on the Publication of Judgments Online, both of which encourage public disclosure of
court decisions and judgments, but also provide three general categories of non-publication: national
security, privacy and adolescent crimes. See Guanyu Sifa Gongkai De Liu Xiang Guiding (关于司法公开
的六项规定) [Six Rules on the Disclosure of Judgments] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8,
2009, effective Dec. 8, 2009), para. 5, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/12-23/2034717.shtml;
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang Gongbu Caipan Wenshu De Guiding (最
高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定) [Measures on the Publication of Judgments
Online] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 21, 2010, effective Nov. 21, 2010), §1, para. 2,
http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/rdzt/sfgkxcyhdzt/zdwj/201203/t20120326_175408.html. In addition, the
rules provide that pending judgments and cases that have been mediated and withdrawn should not be
publicized. See Guanyu Sifa Gongkai De Liu Xiang Guiding (关于司法公开的六项规定) [Six Rules on
the Disclosure of Judgments] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2009, effective Dec. 8, 2009),
§ 2, para. 2.
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Provincial High Court issued detailed implementation guidance for the rules
of disclosure, according to which all judgments effective as of October 1,
2008, should be published online except those that fell clearly in the exempt
categories.124 To encourage compliance, the High Court linked local judges’
compliance with the implementation of the rules to their performance
evaluation. 125 Because administrative lawsuits against tax agents are
unlikely to fall into the exempt categories, a large fraction of them should be
published and available online. Though the author’s research finds that a
few cases are missing from the database, relevant information is available in
published cases, which limits the potential bias.126
The second reason the author selected Henan for the study is the
amount of official malfeasance in the province. Earlier research indicates
that local governments in Henan suffer from a severe fiscal shortage, leading
to heavy tax burdens and highly predatory local officials.127 This gives rise
to massive grievances against the state and a steady supply of administrative
lawsuits. In particular, it gives rise to enough tax-related cases for a
meaningful empirical study.
Third, Henan led other Chinese provinces in promoting administrative
litigation. The Provincial High Court was one of the first to establish a highquality administrative law division.128 With support from the court president
and the provincial party leaders, the division actively promoted lawsuits
against local officials and reported one of the highest administrative
litigation rates in China (calculated as number of filings per resident). 129
124

Cáipàn Wénshū Shàngwǎng Gōngbù Guǎnlǐ Bànfǎ ( 裁 判 文 书 上 网 公 布 管 理 办 法 )
[Administrative Rules Regarding Online Disclosure of Court Decisions and Judgments] (promulgated by
the Henan Supreme Court, Oct. 9, 2009, effective Oct. 14, 2009), http://thxfy.chinacourt.org/public/
detail.php?id=170.
125
Id.
126
The High Court published one lawsuit that it should not have because the plaintiff withdrew the
case. See Yuangao Zhumadian Shi Tian Yi Jiudian Guanli Youxian Gongsi Yu Beigao Henan Sheng
Zhumadian Shi Dìfang Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Shuishou Chafeng Baoquan Cuoshi Weifa Sunhaile Qi Hefa
Quanyi Yi An (原告驻马店市天驿酒店管理有限公司与被告河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局税收
查封保全措施违法损害了其合法权益一案) [Zhumadian Tianze Hotel Management Ltd. v. Henan
Zhumadian Ltd. Inspection Bureau], (Henan Zhumadian Yicheng Dist. Ct. 2009) (on file with author).
Additionally, one administrative case should have been published because the plaintiff received a verdict.
See Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Jiangli
Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren Leliang v. Luoyang STB],
http://xgqfy.chinacourt.org/public/paperview.php?id=433625 (last visited Sept. 27, 2013). Note the three
decisions for the retrial of the Zhumadian cases were not published.
127
See Hongbin Cai, et al., supra note 84 at 62.
128
Ji Li, Suing the State: A Study of Administrative Litigation at the Provincial Level in China 108
(2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with author).
129
Id. at 110-11.
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Moreover, Henan was for a long time the most populous province in
China 130 and, located close to the geographic center of the country, the
province is representative of China in many aspects. For the above reasons,
theories derived from a study of tax-related administrative lawsuits in Henan
should be widely applicable in many other Chinese provinces.
In addition to the lawsuits against tax agents reported by the courts in
Henan, the author conducted archival research into published materials
relating to the cases, the parties involved, and the underlying disputes. This
included other lawsuits (civil and criminal) in which the plaintiffs
participated. This research enabled the author to understand the contexts for
the tax-related administrative disputes and derive a few general attributes
that explain the puzzling existence of tried lawsuits against tax agencies in
China.
Before proceeding to the detailed case analysis, some summary
statistics of the cases are in order. From 2009 to 2011, only forty-one
decisions and judgments involved tax agencies as defendants.131 Because
the sample contains decisions and judgments by both trial and appellate
courts, some of which relate to the same underlying disputes, there are a
total of only nineteen separate complainants. In addition, some courts
reported multiple judgments or decisions for different claims or issues of the
same case. Also, because several of the complainants are related parties,
e.g., companies implicated in the same tax evasion investigation, the actual
number of underlying disputes is even smaller.
Appellate courts rendered sixteen of the forty-one published decisions
and judgments. Plaintiffs appealed more than half of the cases filed after
2009.132 The extra efforts by the plaintiffs, however, did not translate into
substantial benefits. Only three cases appealed by taxpayers were sent back
for retrial, all of which satisfied the appellate court after a few cosmetic
changes by the trial court.133 Among the nineteen plaintiffs, seven initiated
lawsuits in 2009, three in 2010, and nine in 2011. Eight of the plaintiffs are
individuals, the rest are all privately-owned corporate entities. Among the
defendant tax agencies, ten are STB bureaus, eight are LTB bureaus, and one
130
See CHINESE BUREAU OF STATISTICS, REPORTS BASED ON THE YEAR 2000 CONSENSUS, TABLE 1-1
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/renkoupucha/2000pucha/pucha.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2013).
131
Cases on file with the author.
132
Several of the trial court rulings omitted from publication are included in this total.
133
One additional case was sent back to the trial court for a retrial after the procuratorate lodged a
protest. See Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju Shuiwu

Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An (刘永建、杨锋诉光山县财政局税务征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu &
Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department], (Henan Guangshan Cnty. Ct. 2010),
http://www.110.com/panli/panli_4014611.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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is a local finance department. Of the plaintiffs, 52.6% hired legal counsel,
compared to 84.2% of the defendants. 134 Finally, none of the plaintiffs
prevailed at the initial trial.
As discussed in the previous part, judicial bias and agency retaliation
prevent escalation from disputes to administrative lawsuits. Tax agencies,
however, do not enjoy unlimited power. Their jurisdiction is territorial and
other powerful agencies check their power in the political system. Those
that are able to avoid the heavy costs of agency retaliation may sue if
substantial interests are at stake and no alternative resolutions are available.
In addition, as in the resolution of all disputes, high transaction costs and
plaintiffs’ optimism may further contribute to the trial of administrative
lawsuits against tax agencies in China. As will be shown, all of the cases in
the analyzed sample contain one or more of these factors, in ways not
necessarily mutually exclusive.
A.

Lack of Taxable Resources and Professional Whistleblowers

Because tax agencies’ authority is limited to taxable income and
assets, those with low income are largely immune to any post-litigation
retaliation by the agencies. In Ren v. Zhengzhou STB Inspection Bureau, the
plaintiff, a tax whistleblower, reported suspected tax evasion by a furniture
store to the local STB.135 According to the factual findings of the case, the
defendant investigated the reported violation, but failed to inform the
plaintiff of the results.136 The plaintiff alleged the STB inspection bureau
violated the law by not fully disclosing the investigation and the penalties
subsequently imposed.137 The plaintiff in this case had a low-paying job,
which exempted him from paying income taxes other than those withheld by
his employer. 138 Without much to lose, he was therefore immune to
retaliations by local tax agencies, which significantly reduced his actual
litigation costs.
Nonetheless, low costs are costs. What are the plaintiffs’ positive
incentives for challenging powerful state agents in court? In the Ren case,
134

In two of these cases, it is not entirely clear whether the parties were represented by legal counsel.
Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Yunlong Zhao, “Yiyuan Jiangli” Jubaoren Ai Weiquan [“One Yuan Award” Informant Enjoys
Rights-Protection], JINAN TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://news.sohu.com/20111017/n322393854.shtml.
135
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the plaintiff reported possible tax evasion of a local furniture store in order
to receive a material reward. 139 Under current law, the state rewards a
portion of the levies and fines subsequently assessed (capped at 5% of the
deficiency) to tax whistleblowers who contribute to the tax evasion detection
and prosecution.140 In the Ren case, the plaintiff insisted on the disclosure
about the penalty specifically so he could challenge the amount of his
reward. 141 Article 20 of the Administrative Rules re Reporting Tax
Violations, issued by the national office of the STB, provides that tax report
centers should notify the informant of the investigation result, but only if he
so requests.142 In this case, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not make a
clear request for investigation result, so the defendant was not obliged to
inform him.143
In Ren v. Luoyang Xigong District STB, the same tax whistleblower
directly challenged the amount the court rewarded him, which was in the
amount of RMB 1, the equivalent of approximately USD 0.17. 144 The fact
patterns of the two cases are similar: in each case, a merchant refused to
issue invoices evidencing a purchase and the plaintiff reported the possible
tax evasion to the local tax center.145 In Ren v. Luogong, the plaintiff alleged
that the tax inspection bureau failed to take necessary actions to investigate
139

Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html.
140

税务违法案件举报奖励办法 [Rules on Awards for Reporting Tax Law Violations] (July 27,
2005), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8192153/n8192242/n8192667/n8194601/8248300.html.
141
See Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An
Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决
书 ) [Ren v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html.
142

Shuiwu Weifa Anjian Jubao Jiangli Banfa (税务违法案件举报奖励办法) [Rules on Awards for
Reporting Tax Law Violations] (promulgated by the State Administration on Taxation, effective July 27,
2005), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8192153/n8192242/n8192667/n8194601/8248300.html.
143
See Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An
Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决
书 ) [Ren v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html.
144
Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng
Jiangli Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren v. Luoyang
Xigong District STB] (Oct. 26, 2010), (on file with author). Video footage is available at
http://tv.hncourt.org/video/detail/court/0/id/10315 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
145
Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng
Jiangli Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren v. Luoyang
Xigong District STB] (Oct. 26, 2010), (on file with author).
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the case.146 After repeated requests by the plaintiff, the bureau eventually
found the reported merchant in violation of tax law and imposed a fine.147 It
then mailed a notice to the plaintiff of the reward of RMB 1 ( USD 0.17) for
reporting the violation. 148 The tax whistleblower then filed a lawsuit to
challenge the amount of the reward.149 At trial, the lawyer for the tax bureau
argued that if the law had been strictly followed, the reward would have
been even lower (RMB 0.5, or USD 0.085). 150 In other words, the tax
whistleblower had been excessively rewarded. The court ruled for the tax
bureau, though it commented that the reward appeared unreasonably low.151
The meager award in this specific case was not the only incentive for
the lawsuit, nor was the tax whistleblower solely after the legal right to be
informed by tax agencies. To fully understand the plaintiff’s motives, one
has to look at the case in light of its social and legal context. The plaintiff
was a member of an emerging group of professional whistleblowers who
live on the material rewards received for being informants to government
agencies or on compensations from caught violators.152 Over the past two
decades, the state has established a plethora of laws and regulations to
sanction illegal practices such as selling fake products or tax evasion and
provide material rewards to those who assist in enforcement of the law.153
Such a modern-day bounty system can be found in the tax administration of
most countries, including the United States. Because some of the rewards

146

Zhiqiang Huang, Jubao Shangjia Taoshui Jinhuo Yiyuan Jiangli (黄志强, 举报商家逃税仅获一

元奖励, 东方早报 ) [Reporting of Tax Violation Awarded One Yuan Only], DONGFANG DAILY (Sept. 24,
2011), http://www.dfdaily.com/html/33/2011/9/24/670404.shtml.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Yuangao Renleliang Su Beigao Luoyang Shi Xi Gongqu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng
Jiangli Yi An (原告任乐亮诉被告洛阳市西工区国家税务局税务行政奖励一案) [Ren v. Luoyang
Xigong District STB] (Oct. 26, 2010) (on file with author). Video footage is available at: http://tv.
hncourt.org/video/detail/court/0/id/10315 (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
152
Zhengfang Tang, Zhongguo Sanqian Zhiye Dajiaren: Qingjia Dangchan Chihaichong (中国 3000
职业打假人：倾家荡产“吃害虫”) [Three Thousand Professional Whistleblowers in China], NANGUO
DAILY (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.cctv.com/community315/special/C20532/20080122/104785.shtml.
153
See, e.g., Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shípǐn ānquán fǎ (中华人民共和国食品安全法) [Food
Safety Law] (promulgated by order of the President of the People’s Republic of China, Feb. 28, 2009,
effective June 1, 2009), §96, http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/law/200903/t20090320_196425.html;
Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xiāofèi zhě quányì bǎohù fǎ (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法) [Law for
the Protection of Consumer Rights] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, Oct. 31, 1993,
effective Jan. 1, 1994), §49, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8745; Measures on Rewarding
the Reporting of Tax Evasion (July 2005) at § 5 (on file with author).
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are substantial 154 and non-compliance is rampant in China, some
whistleblowers have engaged full-time in seeking out illegal practices and
claiming compensation from the violators or rewards from relevant
government agencies.155
This explains why the plaintiff in Ren v. Luogong sued for RMB 1 and
refused to settle. Because caught violators fear negative publicity, it is easier
for them to compensate a well-known litigious whistleblower directly.
Whistleblowers are therefore incentivized to litigate cases that could receive
intensive media coverage because this enhances their publicity and helps
maintain a credible litigation threat to violators. 156 The media, though still
subject to state control, often find stories about suing government officials
interest-provoking.157 After litigating the Luogong case, Mr. Ren quit his
previous job and became devoted full-time to uncovering and reporting
counterfeits and illegal commercial activities, earning enough to support his
family.158
Among the nineteen plaintiffs who went to trial against tax agencies in
Henan Province from 2009 to 2011, three were whistleblowers159 who share
a few common characteristics—namely that they were largely immune to
potential agency retaliations due to their low and simple-sourced income.
The extra-judicial costs of suing local officials were therefore lower for them
than most other victims of abusive tax agents. In addition, some of the
154

For instance, 2006 Nian Shuishou Jianmian He Weisheng Baojian Fa (2006 年税收减免和卫生保
健法)[Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006] § 406 caps the reward at 30% of the recovered taxes.
155
See Zhengfang Tang, supra note 152.
156
Xingzou zai Bianfengzhong de Zhiye Dajiaren (行走在边缝中的职业打假人群) [Professional
Whistleblowers Walk on the Edge], 379 PHOENIX WKLY. (2010).
157
Daniela Stockmann & Mary E. Gallagher, Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian
Rule in China, 44 COMP. POL. STUD. 436 (2011).
158
Shuxiang Chang & Jiwei Wan, Bubihui Bieren Shuowo Kao Suopei Shenghuo, Jinbao
Mianduimian zhi Dajian Renshi Ren Leliang (不避讳别人说我靠索赔生活 今报面对面之打假人士任乐
亮, 东方今报 ) [Not Afraid of Living on Whistleblowing, Jinbao Faces Whistleblower Ren Leliang],
DONGFANG DAILY (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.jinbw.com.cn/jinbw/xwzx/zzsx/201203137593.htm.
159
Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau] (Zhengzhou 27 Distr. Ct., Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.31credit.com/caselaw/1056106.html; Yuangao Wangpenghui Su Beigao Zhengzhou Shi Erqi
qu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Chuli Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Wenshu (原告王朋辉诉
被告郑州市二七区国家税务局稽查局税务行政处理一案一审行政文书) [Wang v. Zhengzhou 27
District STB Investigation Bureau], (Henan Zhengzhou 27 District Court, Mar. 9, 2011) (on file with
author); Jiaguoqiang Su Henan Sheng Guojia Shuiwu Ju Bufu Fuyi Jueding Yi An Yishen Xingzheng
Panjueshu (贾国强诉河南省国家税务局不服复议决定一案一审行政判决书) [Jia v. Henan Provincial
STB] (Henan Zhengzhou Jinshui District Court, Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.31credit.com
/caselaw/651791.html.
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whistleblowers litigated pro se or with the assistance of fellow
whistleblowers, 160 which further lowered the formal costs of litigation.
Moreover, they were savvy users of public media, which protected them and
eased negotiations for compensation. 161 However, while media coverage
gives the whistleblowers additional incentives to sue, it also increases the
stakes for the defendant agencies to prevail in the lawsuits. Furthermore, the
agencies do not fully incorporate the costs of litigation as individual
disputants. Therefore, in all three of the above mentioned cases initiated by
the informants, the agencies engaged outside legal counsel, even in the case
where the claim was for RMB 1.162
Though low-income earners are retaliation-proof, they are rarely seen
in courts against tax agencies. This, however, should not be a surprise. If an
individual barely survives above the subsistence level, little income is left
for taxation. Therefore, the lack of interaction between low-income earners
and tax collectors curtails the probability of conflicts between the two
parties. Lawsuits do not exist without conflicts in the first place.
B.

Limited Interaction with Tax Agencies

Agency retaliation can be very costly if the complainant expects to
interact with the agency for a long period of time. Therefore, the rational
response to official malfeasance is often to take no action. However, if the
complainant expects no further dealings with the agency, his or her exposure
to retaliation is limited and litigation becomes an attractive option, especially
if substantial interests are at stake.
The lawsuits by Wu Jishan and Li Wenfeng against the local STB of
Xin County best illustrate this point. 163 Before filing the administrative
lawsuit, the plaintiffs had spent years pursuing other paths towards a
remedy. 164 After being laid off during the economic reform of the late
1990s, the plaintiffs invested all their savings and a significant amount of
160

See Jiaguoqiang Su Henan Sheng Guojia Shuiwu Ju Bufu Fuyi Jueding Yi An Yishen Xingzheng

Panjueshu (贾国强诉河南省国家税务局不服复议决定一案一审行政判决书) [Jia v. Henan Provincial
STB]
(Henan
Zhengzhou
Jinshui
District
Court,
Aug.
15,
2011),
http://www.31
credit.com/caselaw/651791.html.
161
See Xingzou zai Bianfengzhong de Zhiye Dajiaren, supra note 156.
162
See Zhiqiang Huang, supra note 146.
163
Wujishan, Liwenfeng Yu Xin Xian Gongye He Xinxi Hua Ju, Xin Xian Gongshang Ju, Xin Xian
Guojia Shuiwu Ju, Xin Xian Zhiliang Jishu Jiandu Ju Xingzheng Peichang Jiufen Yi An (吴继山、李文凤
与新县工业和信息化局、新县工商局、新县国家税务局、新县质量技术监督局行政赔偿纠纷一案)
[Wu Jishan & Li Wenfeng v. Xin County STB and Others for Administrative Compensation], (Henan Xin
County Court, Feb. 28, 2011) (on file with author).
164
Id.
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borrowed money into a mobile gas station.165 In 1999, they obtained all
necessary licenses, permits, and tax registrations for the operation of the
small business.166 Yet, within a year of the approvals, a joint team of local
government officials confiscated all of the plaintiff’s permits and business
licenses and forcefully shut down the gas station without any
compensation.167
During this process, the officials used force and failed to follow legal
procedures.168 Having lost all of their investments, the plaintiffs began to
petition through an alternative channel called “letter and visit” for redress,
arguing that the confiscation and shutdown of their business was illegal.169
Their efforts proved fruitless and Wu suffered a stroke in 2003.170 When his
health improved in 2008, they resumed their petition efforts.171 The local
officials negotiated with the plaintiffs and persuaded them to use the court to
resolve the dispute.172 The plaintiffs agreed that if the court accepted the
case, they would cease petitioning through the letter and visit system. 173
With nothing to lose and their future livelihood at stake, the couple filed an
application for an administrative reconsideration petition and then filed the
lawsuit.174
The legal system, however, was not designed to accommodate such
cases. The court ruled against the plaintiffs on the basis that the statute of
limitations had run.175 The whole adjudicatory process appears to have been
another tactic of the local state to delay the case and add more costs to the
plaintiffs’ pursuit for justice. In addition, by enticing the plaintiffs in a legal
battle they would certainly lose, the local state could label the plaintiffs’ act
“illegal.” Embedded in local politics, trial courts generally cannot resist the
pressure to cooperate and share the responsibilities of the politicians’ illegal
acts.176
As discussed earlier, a tax agency’s control is limited to its own
jurisdiction. Therefore, if a taxpayer’s only contact with a tax jurisdiction is
the holding of certain taxable assets, the interaction between the taxpayer
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Qinghua Wang, supra note 9.
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and the tax agency ends when the ownership terminates, as was the case in
Chen v. Xingyang LBT.177 The taxpayer in that case sold all of his shares in a
cemetery business to another individual.178 The tax bureau of the district
where the cemetery was located calculated his gains from the sale and levied
heavy income taxes. 179 The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit challenging the
calculation.180 With all of the shares in the cemetery business sold and the
only contact with the tax agency’s jurisdiction terminated, the plaintiff freed
himself from future agency retaliation and significantly reduced the extrajudicial costs of litigating the dispute.
Unlike professional whistleblowers who may litigate cases for a trivial
amount of money, but high publicity, most taxpayers sue because large sums
of money are at stake. In the Chen case, the retaliation-proof plaintiff
challenged the assessed tax because it would have imposed a substantial
financial burden on him 181 and he had nothing to lose through agency
retaliation.
C.

Substantial Interests at Stake and a Lack of Alternative Channels for
Dispute Resolution

Trial may also occur if the relationship between the complainant and
the defendant tax agency has turned irremediably hostile. Hostility shuts
down all less confrontational channels for resolving a conflict and litigation
will add little extra cost to the complainant in such a situation. Also, if
substantial interests are at stake, such as large sums of money, longestablished reputations, or the survival of businesses, the lawsuit will likely
go to trial, as illustrated in the following case.
In Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB and
Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB for
Administrative Compensation, the plaintiff was a new subsidiary of a
national company in sales.182 The subsidiary in Zhengzhou had encountered
177

Chen Zhan Shengsu Henan Sheng Xingyang Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Chufa Yi
An Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (陈战胜诉河南省荥阳市地方税务局税务行政处罚一案一审行政判决
书) [Chen v. Xingyang LBT], (Henan Xingyang Court, June 13, 2011) (on file with author).
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An ( 郑 州 博 宇 有 色 金 属 炉 料 有 限 公 司 与 郑 州 市 中 原 区 国 家 税 务 局 一 案 )
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court,
July 1, 2009) (on file with author); Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu
Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu guojia Shuiwu Ju Xingzheng Peichang Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有
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numerous tax administrative problems since its establishment. 183 The
plaintiff suspected that the STB local agent erected administrative barriers in
order to assist the company’s local competitor.184 For instance, the defendant
refused to register the plaintiff as a “general VAT taxpayer” or to properly
issue VAT invoices to the plaintiff.185
Because of the wide discretion enjoyed by the tax agent, these
administrative barriers were not per se illegal. The dispute that triggered the
lawsuit was the tax agent’s refusal to register the plaintiff as a regular
general VAT taxpayer. 186 Under China’s VAT system, newly-established
companies often undergo a trial period.187 For up to six months, the taxpayer
conducts its business under the guidance of relevant tax agents.188 The trial
period ends when the agents consider the taxpayer capable of fulfilling its
VAT-related tax obligations (such as properly distributing VAT invoices).189
During the trial period, deduction for VAT is subject to delay because of the
heightened scrutiny by the tax agency.190 In this case, the local tax agent
denied the plaintiff’s application for registration as a regular general VAT
taxpayer, citing its inability to obtain and issue VAT invoices properly.191
The plaintiff company responded by publishing harsh criticisms of the tax
agents on its company website. 192 The hostility between the two parties
限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局行政赔偿一案) [Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan
District STB for Administrative Compensation], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court, July 1, 2009 (on
file with author).
183
Dui Zhongyuanqi Xushuizhen Guoshuiju De Zaici Tousushu (对中原区须水镇国税局的再次投
诉书) [Second Petition About Zhongyuan District Xushui Township Stb], ZHENGZHOU BOYU LTD. (May 21,
2008), http://www.myboyu.com/news/%E5%86%8D%E6%AC%A1%E6%8A%95%E8%AF%89%E4%
B9%A6/tabid/1497/Default.aspx.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An ( 郑 州 博 宇 有 色 金 属 炉 料 有 限 公 司 与 郑 州 市 中 原 区 国 家 税 务 局 一 案 )
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court,
July 1, 2009) (on file with author).
187
Guójiā shuìwù zǒngjú guānyú jiāqiáng xīn bàn shāngmào qǐyè zēngzhí shuì zhēngshōu guǎnlǐ
yǒuguān wèntí de jǐnjí tōngzhī (国家税务总局关于加强新办商贸企业增值税征收管理有关问题的紧急
通 知 )[STB Notice on Issues Regarding VAT Collection and Administration for Newly-Established
Businesses] (repealed in 2010 by Administrative Rules On Vat General Taxpayer During Trial Period),
http://www.jincao.com/fa/17/law17.s132.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
188
Id. at § 3.
189
Id.
190
Id. at § 4.
191
Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An ( 郑 州 博 宇 有 色 金 属 炉 料 有 限 公 司 与 郑 州 市 中 原 区 国 家 税 务 局 一 案 )
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court,
July 1, 2009) (on file with author).
192
Dui Zhongyuanqi Xushuizhen Guoshuiju De Zaici Tousushu, supra note 183.
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almost certainly ruled out the option of non-judicial resolution of their
dispute.
Because the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the local agent, the court
rejected its application for administrative reconsideration immediately. 193
During trial and appeal, the plaintiff produced evidence, such as audio
recordings of a key witness, to show that it had complied with the relevant
regulations and that the defendant had abused its discretion.194 The counsel
for the defendant argued that the identity of the recorded person could not be
verified so the audio evidence could not contradict the written testimony of
the witness used by the defendant as evidence of VAT non-compliance.195
Both the trial court and the appellate court, instead of exercising their
judicial authority and verifying the identity of the key person, readily
accepted the defendant counsel’s technical argument and ruled for the tax
agent.196
The plaintiff likely consulted its parent company’s corporate counsel
before filing the lawsuits.197 Given the amount of evidence gathered from
dealings with the defendant agency, the counsel was likely optimistic about
winning the case and perhaps inspired the plaintiff’s persistence in the trial
and subsequent appeal. However, apparently fair evidentiary rules applied
by a selectively passive court produced surprising results.
Similarly, in Hua County Hongri Auto Ltd. v. Hua County LTB
Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office and the derivative lawsuit for administrative
compensation, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant tax
agency was broken prior to the filing of the lawsuits.198 The plaintiff in these
lawsuits registered with the local tax office in early 2007199 but paid no taxes
193
Zhengzhou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan Qu
Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An ( 郑 州 博 宇 有 色 金 属 炉 料 有 限 公 司 与 郑 州 市 中 原 区 国 家 税 务 局 一 案 )
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (Henan Zhengzhou Intermediate Court,
July 1, 2009) (on file with author).
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Dui Zhongyuanqi Xushuizhen Guoshuiju De Zaici Tousushu, supra note 183.
198
See Huá xiàn hóng rì chē yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī su huá xiàn dìfāng shuìwù jú chéngguān zhōngxīn
shuìwù suǒ shuìwù xíngzhèng zhēngshōu yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng pànjuéshū (滑县红日车业有限公司诉滑
县地方税务局城关中心税务所税务行政征收一案二审行政判决书) [Hua County Hongri Auto Ltd. v.
Hua County Ltb Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office Re Administrative Taking], (Anyang Intermediate Court)
(on file with author); Shàngsù rén huá xiàn hóng rì chē yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī yīn yāoqiú huá xiàn dìfāng
shuìwù jú chéngguān zhōngxīn shuìwù suǒ xíngzhèng péicháng yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng pànjuéshū (上诉人
滑县红日车业有限公司因要求滑县地方税务局城关中心税务所行政赔偿一案二审行政判决书) [Hua
County Hongri Auto Ltd. v. Hua County Ltb Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office Re Administrative
Compensation] (on file with author).
199
See Huá xiàn hóng rì chē yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī su huá xiàn dìfāng shuìwù jú chéngguān zhōngxīn
shuìwù suǒ shuìwù xíngzhèng zhēngshōu yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng pànjuéshū (滑县红日车业有限公司诉滑

JANUARY 2014

ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS AGAINST TAX AGENCIES IN CHINA

89

until May 2008 when the tax office issued a deficiency letter.200 After the
plaintiff failed to respond,201 its legal representative was arrested under the
charge of criminal tax evasion. He pled guilty and was sentenced to six
months in jail with one year suspension and a fine of RMB 20,000
(approximately USD 3,000).202 The plaintiff was also ordered to pay back
taxes and tax penalty in the amount of more than RMB 20,000 .203 The
criminal prosecution most likely closed the door for negotiation and
settlement. Moreover, having suffered the criminal punishment, the plaintiff
likely feared no further retaliation by local tax officials. With much at stake,
the plaintiff filed administrative lawsuits against the tax agency.204 After the
trial court unsurprisingly dismissed the claims,205 the plaintiff appealed.206
Upon appeal, the plaintiff’s lawyer pointed out several major errors
committed by the trial court, which included: 1) the court’s disregard for the
company’s status as a newly established company (meaning the enterprise
income tax should not have been imposed),207 2) the lack of a legal basis for
levying real estate tax and land use tax (the evidence was collected during
the criminal prosecution and after the administrative penalties had been
levied),208 and 3) the agency’s failure to follow relevant legal procedures in
providing most of the legal documents to the plaintiff, directly causing her
failure to timely appeal the penalties and advance relevant legal claims.209
The plaintiff asked the appellate court to reverse the trial court’s ruling and
to order compensation for her losses due to the defendant’s illegal actions.210
The appellate court agreed with the trial court, even though the tax
agency failed to provide sufficient evidence of its compliance with legal
procedures.211 The court emphasized that the criminal charges, unchallenged
by the plaintiff, clearly established the validity of the tax penalties.212

县地方税务局城关中心税务所税务行政征收一案二审行政判决书) [Hua County Hongri Auto Ltd. v.
Hua County Ltb Chengguanzhongxin Tax Office Re Administrative Taking], (Anyang Intermediate Court)
(on file with author).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
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Another case sharing similar features is Xin'an Huafeng Corp. v.
Henan Xin'an STB for Administrative Compensation, where the plaintiff
sued local STB agents after its application for administrative compensation
was rejected. 213 The application claimed that the tax agents forged
documents causing the applicant and his company to be criminally
prosecuted for tax evasion. 214 The plaintiff used to have close business
relationships with the local government and had previously extended trade
credits to two companies owned by the government.215 By 1999, the two
county-owned companies owed the plaintiff back payments totaling more
than RMB 1.3 million.216 When the debtors refused to pay back the loans,
the plaintiff took them to court.217 While the civil case was being litigated
and the court put a lien on the debtors’ assets, the plaintiff was arrested by
Xin’an County police and prosecuted for tax evasion and fraud. 218 The
county court found him guilty of both crimes and sentenced him to prison
for six years, plus a fine of RMB 200,000.219
On appeal, the intermediate court sent the case back for retrial by the
county court, which again found the plaintiff guilty of tax evasion, but
dismissed the fraud charge.220 The plaintiff was sentenced to three years in
prison, with a three-year reprieve.221 By the time the plaintiff was released
on bail, he had spent seventeen months in jail.222 The plaintiff then appealed
the county court decision to the intermediate court, which affirmed the
decision.223 The tax evasion case was publicized that year as one of eight
major cases in Henan Province. 224 The salience of the case and the

213

Xin'an Huafeng Corp. V. Henan Xin'an STB for Administrative Compensation (新安华峰中油销
售公司诉河南省新安县国家税务局行政赔偿纠纷一案一审行政裁定书), (Henan Laocheng District
Court) (on file with author).
214
See Xīn'ān huá fēng zhōngyóu xiāoshòu gōngsī su hénán shěng xīn'ān xiàn guójiā shuìwù jú
xíngzhèng péicháng jiūfēn yī àn yīshěn xíngzhèng cáidìng shū (新安华峰中油销售公司诉河南省新安县
国家税务局行政赔偿纠纷一案一审行政裁定书) [Xin'an Huafeng Corp. v. Henan Xin'an STB for
Administrative Compensation], (Henan Laocheng District Court) (on file with author).
215
See Henan Laoban Xiang Zhengfu Qiye Cuikuang Hou Bei Panxing, Baniang Hou Huo Qingbai
[Henan Businessman Sentenced after Demanding Debt Payment from SOE, Acquital After Eight Years],
DAOHE BAO (Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-10/13/c_12653610.htm.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
STATE ADMINISTRATION OF TAXATION, DAIHE BAO,TOUTAO KENGPIAN GUOJIA SHUISHOU
1357.82 WANYUAN, BAQIYE HEIBANG YOUMING (偷逃坑骗国家税收 1357.82 万元 8 企业“黑榜”有名],”
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endorsement by different levels of the local government made it difficult to
reverse the judgment.
As noted earlier, the Chinese judicial system allows for the reopening
or retrial of a case that has been decided by an appellate court. The lack of
finality to the judicial process partially explains why some litigants persist
on going to trial even though they fully expect to lose. With a possibility of
favorable results at higher levels, taxpayers may litigate if the stakes
involved are high enough. In the case described above, the plaintiff
followed this path and petitioned the appellate court for a review of its own
decision.225 When the petition was rejected, he brought the complaint all the
way to the provincial high court.226 The high court accepted it in 2005, but
waited until 2010 to render a ruling favorable to the plaintiff.227
The dramatic prosecution and subsequent quest for justice exhausted
the plaintiff’s wealth, insulating him for future costs of agency retaliation.
Also, the prosecution by the county government inevitably resulted in deep
hostility between the parties, closing all other channels for resolving their
conflicts. Moreover, lengthy legal battles usually educate plaintiffs about
how to navigate the judicial system, making them more inclined to sue.228
With substantial interests at stake, the plaintiff filed lawsuits against a
number of powerful local government agencies soon after the provincial
high court reversed the lower decision.229
Litigation may also be the only option if the taxpayer is implicated in
major corruption cases, as illustrated by Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. v.
Zhumadian LTB Inspection Bureau and related cases. 230 All of the tax
大河报) [TAX EVASION OF 13.5782 MILLION YUAN, EIGHT COMPANIES ON BLACKLIST] (May 17, 2004),
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n9948163/10023706.html.
224
Henan Laoban Xiang Zhengfu Qiye Cuikuang Hou Bei Panxing, Baniang Hou Huo Qingbai,
[Henan Businessman Sentenced after Demanding Debt Payment from SOE, Acquital After Eight Years],
DAOHE BAO (Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-10/13/c_12653610.htm.
225
Henan Laoban Xiang Zhengfu Qiye Cuikuang Hou Bei Panxing, Baniang Hou Huo Qingbai,
[Henan Businessman Sentenced after Demanding Debt Payment from SOE, Acquital After Eight Years],
Daohe Bao (Oct. 13, 2010), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-10/13/c_12653610.htm.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
See Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchantment” and the
Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 783, 802-05 (2006).
229
See, e.g., Yuángào lúshūmín, lúzhànfēng, zhānghuìlíng, mèng dōngjiāng yīn yǔ bèigào xīn'ān xiàn
chǎnyè jíjù qū guǎnlǐ wěiyuánhuì xíngzhèng péicháng yī àn de xíngzhèng yīshěn cáidìng, (2011) luò xíng
chū zì dì 6 hào (原告卢书民、卢占峰、张会玲、孟东江因与被告新安县产业集聚区管理委员会行政
赔偿一案的行政一审裁定, （2011）洛行初字第 6 号) [Lu et al v. Xin’an County Industrial District
Administration Committee re Administrative Compensation] (2011) (on file with author).
230
See Yuángào zhùmǎdiàn shì jīnfǎ jīngjì màoyì yǒuxiàn gōngsī bèigào hénán shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì
dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú xíngzhèng chǔfá yī àn (原告驻马店市金发经济贸易有限公司被告河南省驻马
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disputes behind these administrative lawsuits can be traced back to a series
of bribery prosecutions, and the companies suspected of playing a
facilitating role were investigated by several government agencies, including
the LTB inspection bureau. 231 After the investigation, the tax agency levied
heavy fines.232 For instance, the LTB fined Yatai Shiye Ltd. about RMB 85
million and Jinfa Ltd. about RMB 20 million.233 Several companies’ assets
were insufficient to pay the penalties, so the inspection bureau went after
their shareholders in an attempt to pierce the corporate veil.234
The penalties were too heavy for the investigated companies to fully
comply with, especially after huge sums had been transferred to a third
party.235 Because other channels for dispute resolution had been closed, the
companies seemingly had no choice but to file administrative lawsuits
challenging the penalties. Moreover, because they had lost all of their
assets, the plaintiffs were immune to further retaliation. The initial set of
trial court decisions contain simple dismissals of the complaints, with the

店市地方税务局稽查局行政处罚一案) [Zhumadian Jinfa Jingji Maoyi Ltd. v. Henan Zhumadian LTB
Inspection Bureau], (Henan Zhumadian City Yicheng District Court) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Zhumadian Jinfa v. Henan Zhumadian]; Yuángào zhùmǎdiàn shì yà tài shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī bèigào hénán
shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú xíngzhèng chǔfá yī àn (原告驻马店市亚泰实业有限公司
被 告 河 南 省 驻 马 店 市 地 方 税 务 局 稽 查 局 行 政 处 罚 一 案 ) [Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. v. Henan
Zhumadian LTB Inspection Bureau], (Henan Zhumadian City Yicheng District Court) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Zhumadian Yatai v. Henan Zhumadian]; Yuángào zhùmǎdiàn shì gāoxīn qū jīnmíng shāngmào
yǒuxiàn gōngsī bèigào hénán shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú xíngzhèng chǔfá yī àn (原告
驻马店市高新区金明商贸有限公司被告河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局行政处罚一案)
[Zhumadian Gaoxin District Jinming Shangmao Ltd. v. Henan Zhumadian LTB Inpsection Bureau],
(Henan Zhumadian City Yicheng District Court) (on file with author) [hereinafter Zhumadian Gaoxin v.
Henan Zhumadian].
231
See Hénán shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú shēnqǐng zhíxíng bèi zhíxíng rén
zhùmǎdiàn shì yà tài shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī, bèi zhíxíng rén zhùmǎdiàn shì jīnfǎ màoyì fāzhǎn yǒuxiàn
gōngsī zhíxíng yìyì cáidìng shū (河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局申请执行被执行人驻马店市亚泰实
业有限公司、被执行人驻马店市金发贸易发展有限公司执行异议裁定书) [Henan Zhumadian LTB
Inspection Bureau Motion for Execution Re Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. & Zhumadian Jinfa Maoyi
Fazhan Ltd.], (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author).
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Zhōu nóngchǎng děng yǔ zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú lànyòng gōngsī fǎrén dúlì dìwèi
hé gǔdōng yǒuxiàn zérèn péicháng jiūfēn yī àn (周农场等与驻马店市地方税务局稽查局滥用公司法人
独立地位和股东有限责任赔偿纠纷一案）[Zhou Nongchang and Others v. Zhumadian LTB], (Henan
High Court) (on file with author).
235
See Hénán shěng zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú shēnqǐng zhíxíng bèi zhíxíng rén
zhùmǎdiàn shì yà tài shíyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī, bèi zhíxíng rén zhùmǎdiàn shì jīnfǎ màoyì fāzhǎn yǒuxiàn
gōngsī zhíxíng yìyì cáidìng shū (河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局申请执行被执行人驻马店市亚泰实
业有限公司、被执行人驻马店市金发贸易发展有限公司执行异议裁定书) [Henan Zhumadian LTB
Inspection Bureau Motion for Execution Re Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. & Zhumadian Jinfa Maoyi
Fazhan Ltd.], (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author).
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court briefly noting that the statute of limitations had run and the plaintiffs
failed to show cause.236
The plaintiffs appealed the trial court decisions, which were reversed
by the appellate court and sent back for retrial.237 The trial court again ruled
in favor of the tax agency but this time on technical grounds.238 The legal
representatives of the plaintiff companies were fugitives wanted by the local
police.239 Unable to appear in court, they engaged a lawyer from Beijing,
who was granted the power of attorney to litigate the cases against the local
LTB.240 During the retrial, the defendant argued that the lawyer could not
prove that the seal and signatures on the engagement letters were authentic,
taking advantage of the fact that the clients could not appear in court to
testify.241 The lawyer made the reasonable rebuttal that the defendant should
bear the burden to prove that the prima facie valid seal and signatures were
forged.242 The court, however, sided with the tax agency and dismissed the
cases. 243 The appellate court, apparently reluctant to step into a battle
between the fugitives and the powerful local tax agency, upheld the trial
court decisions this time.244
Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB245 is further proof that
litigation is the only available channel for dispute resolution when business
relations with the government fail. In this case, the plaintiff challenged an
enormous deficiency assessed by the city LTB.246 The plaintiff’s company
236

Yuángào zhùmǎdiàn shì gāoxīn qū jīnmíng shāngmào yǒuxiàn gōngsī bèigào hénán shěng
zhùmǎdiàn shì dìfāng shuìwù jú jīchá jú xíngzhèng chǔfá yī àn (原告驻马店市高新区金明商贸有限公司
被告河南省驻马店市地方税务局稽查局行政处罚一案) [Zhumadian Gaoxin District Jinming Shangmao
Ltd. v. Henan Zhumadian LTB Inpsection Bureau], (Henan Zhumadian City Yicheng District Court) (on
file with author).
237
See Zhumadian Yatai Shiye Ltd. for Administrative Punishment (驻马店市亚泰实业有限公司税
务 行 政 处 罚 一 案 二 审 行 政 裁 定 书 ), (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author);
Zhumadian Gaoxin District Jinming Shangmao Ltd. for Administrative Punishment (驻马店市高新区金明
商贸有限公司税务行政处罚一案二审行政裁定书), (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with
author); Zhumadian Jinfa Jingji Maoyi Ltd. for Administrative Punishment (驻马店市金发经济贸易有限
公司税务行政处罚一案二审行政裁定书), (Henan Zhumadian Intermediate Court) (on file with author).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB Re (2009) 005 and (2010) 005 Punishment (新乡
市运工贸有限公司不服被告卫辉市地方税务局卫地税罚（2009）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》和
卫地税罚（2010）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》一审行政判决书), (Henan Weihui City Court) (on
file with author).
246
Id.
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had at one point enjoyed close business ties with the local government.247
The two parties agreed to set up a joint venture, but the local government
failed to invest the prior stipulated amount of capital.248 Instead of letting
the joint venture dissolve, the local government granted the company tax
deductions as replacement for the capital investment.249 It also ordered other
government agencies to allow the joint venture to pass annual examination
and registration, despite insufficient equity. 250 At a certain point, the
cooperative state-business relationship must have broken down because in
2004, the tax bureau issued the plaintiff a penalty for tax deficiency, which
the plaintiff paid in full.251 In 2009, the LTB again audited the company’s
accounts from 1995 to 2009, issued a deficiency notice with penalty, and
broadcasted it on local television.252 The accumulated hostility, the publicity
of the tax controversy, and the substantial stakes for both parties made
litigation the preferred option to resolve this dispute.
Following an administrative reconsideration decision in favor of the
tax agency, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit and raised numerous legal issues,
both procedural and substantive.253 The plaintiff claimed that the “Notice of
Tax Deficiency and Penalty” was issued twice and delivered ineffectively to
one of the plaintiff’s lawyers, who lacked the requisite special power of
attorney.254 The plaintiff also presented evidence that its tax registration had
been revoked so that the defendant was partially responsible for the
plaintiff’s noncompliance and that some of the taxes were erroneously
assessed.255
The court regarded these procedural and evidentiary issues as minor
flaws that were not critical to the court’s decision. 256 Upon appeal, the
plaintiff made a similar technical argument about the illegality of the
247

Id.
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
See Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Shuìshōu Zhēngshōu Guǎnlǐ Fǎ (中华人民共和国税收
征 收 管 理 法 ) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s
Congress, April 28, 2001, effective May 1, 2001), ch. 1, art. 1-2, http://www.gov.cn/banshi/200508/31/content_146791.htm.
253
Xinxiang Shi Yun Gong Mao Youxian Gongsi Bufu Beigao Wei Hui Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Wei
Dishui Fa (2009) 005 Bao “Shuiwu Xingzheng Chufa Juedìng Shu” He Wei Dishui Fa (2010) 005 Hao
“Shuiwu Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Shu” Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu, (新乡市运工贸有限公司不服被
告卫辉市地方税务局卫地税罚（2009）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》和卫地税罚（2010）005 号
《税务行政处罚决定书》一审行政判决书) [Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB Re (2009)
005 and (2010) 005 Punishment], (Henan Weihui City Ct.) (on file with author).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
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“Notice of Tax Deficiency and Penalty,” but the appellate court affirmed
without engaging in any detailed legal discussion of these technicalities.257
Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City LTB is another case where
a damaged business-government relationship resulted in administrative
litigation. 258 The plaintiff, a real estate developer, held close personal
relationships with former leaders of Zhoukou City.259 The plaintiff worked
on an infrastructure project in Zhoukou to which the municipal government
promised capital investment.260 However, instead of capital investment, the
government decided to grant the plaintiff substantial tax benefits to cover the
cost of the project due to a fiscal shortage.261 Yet before the project was
completed, the developer’s political allies left local politics due to job
changes and criminal prosecutions for corruption.262 After the project was
completed, the plaintiff negotiated with the local LTB about the promised
tax benefits, but the negotiation went slowly. 263 The loss of political
protection likely explains the delay by the LTB in approving the tax benefits
promised by the former local leaders. The plaintiff then engaged in self-help
and reported zero revenue gain to the LTB for year 2008. 264 The LTB
responded immediately by assessing a tax deficiency and imposing heavy
257

Xinxiang Shi Yun Gong Mao Youxian Gongsi Su Wei Hui Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu

Chuli Jueding Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu, (新乡市运工贸有限公司诉卫辉市地方税务局
税务处理决定一案二审行政判决书) [Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City Ltb], (Xinxiang
City Interm. Ct.) (on file with author).
258
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian
Si Yue Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi
Bu Yu Shouli Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月
三十日作出的周地税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou
Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City LTB], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).
259
Hong Xin, 河 南 一 开 发 商 “ 非 典 型 逃 税 ” 领 4 亿 元 天 价 罚 单 [A Henan Developer's
"Extraordinary Tax Evasion" Penalty of 400 Million Yuan], 法制日报 [LEGAL DAILY] (Feb. 11 2010),
http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14775/21684/10972241.html.
260
Id.
261
The method may also reflect the government’s intention to bypass the public bidding procedure
required for usual public projects.
262

Zhanghaiqin Fan Shouhuì Zui, Jue Caichan Laiyuan Buming Zui Yi An, (张海钦犯受贿罪、巨额

财产来源不明罪一案) [Zhang Haiqin for Corruption], (Henan High Ct.) (on file with author) (plaintiff’s
legal representative was also suspected for bribery). See generally, 河南省十届人大代表范学林涉嫌行贿
将逮捕 [Tenth National People’s Congress of Henan Province will arrest Fanxue Lin for alleged Bribery],
HENAN PEOPLE (Sep. 28, 2007, 7:53 AM), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2007/09/28/223934.html.
263
Hong Xin, 河 南 一 开 发 商 “ 非 典 型 逃 税 ” 领 4 亿 元 天 价 罚 单 [A Henan Developer's
"Extraordinary Tax Evasion" Penalty of 400 Million Yuan], 法制日报 [LEGAL DAILY] (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://unn.people.com.cn/GB/14775/21684/10972241.html.
264
Id.
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penalties that exceeded RMB 400 million (USD 63 million).265 The owner
of the company was arrested and charged with criminal tax evasion.266
The plaintiff then filed a petition for administrative reconsideration.267
The petition was rejected on the alleged basis that the plaintiff failed to pay
the deficiency, which under current law is a precondition for administrative
reconsideration of tax-related issues. 268 The plaintiff then sued the
reconsideration body for the LTB.269 The plaintiff produced the minutes of
the municipal government meeting, which noted in writing that the costs
incurred in the project should be covered by tax deductions.270 The plaintiff
argued that its investment should therefore be equivalent to the assessed
deficiency and sufficient to satisfy the payment requirement for
administrative reconsideration.271 The court found that the minutes did not
constitute a valid legal basis for tax deduction. 272 Given the political
complexity of the case and the amount at stake, the court must have been
reluctant to involve itself in the dispute and readily upheld the decision of
the administrative reconsideration body, leaving the plaintiff without legal
recourse.
Given the high stakes and lack of alternative resolution channels due
to the change in local leadership, the plaintiff sued the LTB and several other
powerful local government agencies. 273 As noted earlier, though the
265

Id.
Id.
267
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian
Si Yue Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi
266

Bu Yu Shouli Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月
三十日作出的周地税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou
Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City LTB], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).
268
Shuìwù xíngzhèng fùyì guīzé ( 税 务 行 政 复 议 规 则 ) [Tax Rules for Administrative
Reconsideration] (promulgated by the State Administration of Tax Bureau, Dec. 15, 2009, effective
April 1, 2010), http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8138502/9563669.html.
269
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v.
Zhoukou City LTB], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).
270
Id.
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Id.
272
Id.
273
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhoukou Shi Guotu Ziyuan Ju Zuochu De Zhou Tu
Fa Jue Zi (2009) 5 Hao Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司与周口市国土资源局
作出的周土罚决字（2009）5 号行政处罚决定一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou Bureau of
State Land Administration], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author); Zhoukou Hui Lin
Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhoukou Shi Renmin Zhengfu Zhouzhengtu (2009) 132 Hao Xingzheng
Jueding Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司与周口市人民政府周政土（2009）132 号行政决定一案)
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probability of prevailing in the trial court was minimal, the plaintiff might
have held some hope for the intervention from the appellate and provincial
high courts.274 The plaintiff’s case, however, rests on a very narrow legal
basis. The promise of tax benefits recorded in the meeting minutes
contradicts the Law on Tax Administration,275 limiting the chance of reversal
by a higher court.
The wealthy developer in this case had accumulated significant
political capital before the onset of the confrontations with the LTB and
other government agencies.276 The close ties between the developer and the
previous local leaders, which contributed to his early business success,
turned against him when he lost political support and had to rely on the
judiciary for protection. Had there been more transparency in his interaction
with the local government and stronger legal basis for his claim, the result
might have been different, as illustrated by the following case.
In Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department and its
retrial, the plaintiffs were also in the real estate business.277 In July 2008, the
plaintiffs won a public auction to develop commercial real estate on a lot in
Guangshan County.278 In September 2009, the county department of finance
levied a tax of RMB 355,110 (USD 56,000) over the two plaintiffs for
occupation and use of arable land.279 The plaintiffs contended that the tax
was levied erroneously because they purchased the land-use right from the
county government, which had already converted the land from agricultural
use to commercial and construction use. Plaintiffs also claimed that the
Provisional Rules re Taxes for Occupation and Use of Agricultural Land and
its implementation rules jointly issued by the State Council and the STB
stipulated that the county government, as the party responsible for the
[Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou Municipal Government], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on
file with author).
274
See Hong Xin, supra note 263. The provincial high court accepted the plaintiff’s petition for
review, but has not responded.
275
See Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó shuìshōu zhēngshōu guǎnlǐ fǎ (中华人民共和国税收征收管理
法) [Tax Collection Management Law] (promulgated by the Ninth National People’s Congress, April 28,
2001, effective May 1, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm.
276
Hénán shěng shí jiè réndà dàibiǎo fànxuélín shèxián xínghuì jiāng dàibǔ (河南省十届人大代表
范学林涉嫌行贿 将逮捕 ) [Henan Provincial People’s Congress Deputy to be Arrested for Bribery],
HENAN PEOPLE (Sept. 28, 2007), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2007/09/28/223934.html.
277
Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju
Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征
收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
278
Id.
279
The tax is still collected by the finance department in some localities.
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conversion, should pay the tax.280 Citing the STB Notice Regarding Certain
Issues in the Collection of Land Occupation Tax, a normative document, the
defendant county finance department argued that the party in actual use of
the arable land should be liable for the tax.281 The trial court ignored the
conflict between the applicable law and the STB normative document (the
judge actually determined that the two were consistent) and ruled against the
plaintiffs.282
Instead of appealing the trial court decision, however, the plaintiffs
applied for the procuratorate to lodge a protest, contending that the trial
court relied on dubious evidence and applied the law erroneously.283 The
appellate court agreed with the procuratorate and sent the case back to the
county court for retrial.284 A different panel of trial judges acknowledged its
mistake and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.285
This case contrasts with Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v. Zhoukou City
LTB. 286 In Liu & Yang, the plaintiffs won a bid at a public auction to
develop a lot whereas in Zhoukou Huilin the plaintiff was designated by a
local leader to invest in the infrastructural project.287 The local governments
levied heavy taxes on plaintiffs in both cases,288 but the plaintiffs in Liu &
280
See Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng
Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务
征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju

Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征
收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v.
Zhoukou City LTB], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).
287
See Hong Xin, supra note 263.
288
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v.
Zhoukou City LTB], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author); Yuanshen Yuangao
Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng
Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang
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Yang faced less serious charges than the plaintiffs in Zhoukou Huilin. 289
Though it is unrealistic to completely rule out corruption in the public
auction, it would certainly take more for the local state to challenge the
legality of the auction procedure than the private deal in Zhoukou Huilin.
When disputes with the local governments involving substantial
stakes arose, the plaintiffs in Liu & Yang were able to rely on formal law for
remedy whereas the plaintiff in Zhoukou Huilin found formal law against its
interests. 290 Though in both cases the local courts ruled in favor of the
defendant local government agencies, the plaintiffs in the former solicited
the assistance of both the procuratorate and the appellate court. 291 In
Zhoukou Huilin, however, the plaintiff’s prospect of success was more
uncertain because higher courts, if reviewing the trial decision strictly in
accordance with the law, would be unlikely to reverse the decision.
D.

Powerful Allies in the Political System

As demonstrated by the reversal of trial court decision in Liu & Yang,
the state is not monolithic. Power tends to be more fragmented at the
municipal and provincial level, where the government structure is complex
and extensive, and agencies have narrow and specialized jurisdictions. It is
therefore possible for taxpayers to maintain good relationships with certain
power holders and at the same time be antagonistic towards the tax agencies.
Though Chinese courts exhibit systemic bias in favor of companies with
political connections, 292 that bias is less serious when both disputants are
v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan County Ct. 2010) (on file with
author).
289
Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng Ju
Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务征
收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
290
Zhoukou Hui Lin Zhiye Youxian Gongsi Bufu Zhoukou Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Er Jiu Nian Si Yue
Sanshi Ri Zuochu De Zhou Dishui Fu Bu Shou Zì (2009) Di 1 Bao Shuiwu Xingzheng Fuyi Bu Yu Shouli
Jueding Shu Yi An, (周口汇林置业有限公司不服周口市地方税务局二○○九年四月三十日作出的周地
税复不受字（2009）第 1 号税务行政复议不予受理决定书一案) [Zhoukou Huilin Zhiye Ltd. v.
Zhoukou City LTB], (Zhoukou City Chuanhui Dist. Ct.) (on file with author).
291
Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian
Caizheng Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山
县财政局税务征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial],
(Henan Guangshan County Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
292
Michael Firth, et al., The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate
Litigation in China, 54 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 573 (2011).
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powerful or have powerful allies.293 Fearing to offend either party, judges
will carefully address issues raised by both, as illustrated in both the Liu &
Yang retrial and the following case, Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Sales
and Service Ltd. v. Nanyang STB.
1.

Politically-Connected Individuals Use the Law to Protect and Extend
Their Interests

In Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian,294
the plaintiff company had a history of contested ownership. Originally
owned and managed by the regional military division, the company went
through a management buyout in 2003 to implement a state policy.295 Jiang,
the officer who had managed the company before the sale, purchased a
majority of the offered shares with a loan of RMB 3.7 million from Wang.296
The loan agreement stipulated that Jiang would transfer 80% of the
purchased shares to Wang, but continue to serve as board director for three
years after the buyout.297
Disputes arose when Jiang refused to transfer the shares to Wang.
Instead of suing Jiang for breach of contract, Wang presented the loan
agreement to the local bureau of industry and commerce, which allowed him
to change the corporate ownership structure and to appoint himself board
director.298 Though his approval was legally required, Jiang did not know of
these changes until he lost control of the company.299 In December 2004,
Jiang filed an administrative lawsuit against the local bureau of industry and
commerce, seeking revocation of the new business license and restoration of
the previous one. 300 The trial court ruled in favor of Jiang. 301 Both the
defendant and Wang appealed the decision to the provincial high court,
which reversed the trial court decision. 302 As noted earlier, an appellate
293

Ji Li, When Are There More Laws? When Do They Matter? Using Game Theory to Compare Laws,
Power Distribution, and Legal Environments in the United States and China, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.
335, 347 (2007).
294
Shanghai Dazhong Qiche Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi, Jiangshujian Yin
Qinquan Jiufen Yi An Ershen Minshi Caiding Shu, (上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司、姜书建
因侵权纠纷一案二审民事裁定书) [Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian],
(Nanyang Interm. Ct.) (on file with author).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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decision, though final in theory, may be further challenged through a petition
for a retrial.303 Jiang filed such a petition, and the high court reviewed and
reversed its own earlier judgment.304
Armed with the favorable high court judgment, Jiang went to the local
Bureau of Industry and Commerce to negotiate the restoration of the original
business license for Nanyang Auto. 305 Wang, informed of Jiang’s
whereabouts, sent a group of people to harass him.306 Jiang was beaten in
the government building, for which Wang was arrested and jailed for seven
days. 307 Unsatisfied with the “harsh” punishment, Wang filed an
administrative lawsuit against the local police. 308 The trial court found
sufficient evidence to uphold the police’s administrative action. 309 Wang
then appealed and the appellate court affirmed.310
2.

Fearing Both Parties, the Court in Nanyang Auto Conducted a
Careful, Balanced Analysis

Having participated in numerous civil and administrative lawsuits at
all levels of the provincial judiciary, Wang understood how the Chinese legal
system operated in practice. 311 He also had allies in the local state,
evidenced by the assistance he received from the Bureau of Industry and
Commerce and the nominal punishment he received for organizing an
assault on Jiang in a government building. 312 Well-connected individuals
303

See Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng sùsòng fǎ ( 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 行 政 诉 讼 法 )
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Seventh National people’s Congress, April 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 62.
304
Qian Wu & Ning Wang, Nanyang Admininistrative Suit Settled after Five Years, Nanyang Bic
Lost (南阳民告官案 5 年之后尘埃落定 南阳工商局败诉), HENAN LEGAL REP. (河南法制报) (Dec. 25,
2009) , http://news.shangdu.com/101/2009/12/25/2009-12-25_300054_101.shtml.
305
Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian (上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限
公司、姜书建因侵权纠纷一案二审民事裁定书), (Nanyang Intermediate Court) (on file with author).
306

Wang Guihua v. Nanyang Public Security Bureau Wancheng Branch (王贵华诉南阳市公安局宛

城分局不服行政处罚一案一审行政判决书), (Nanyang City Wancheng District Court) (on file with
author).
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310

Wang Gui Huawei Zhian Xingzheng Chufa I An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu (王贵华为治安行

政处罚一案二审行政判决书), [Wang Guihua Security Administrative Punishment for the Case of Second
Instance Administrative Judgments], (Henan Nanyang Intermediate Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
311
See Gallagher, supra note 228, for a general empirical discussion of the effect of personal
experience of litigation on the inclination to sue.
312
See Shanghai Dazhong Qiche Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi, Jiangshujian Yin
Qinquan Jiufen Yi An Ershen Minshi Caiding Shu (上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司、姜书建因侵
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such as Wang are largely immune to extra-judicial agency retaliation;
therefore, when the local STB sent Nanyang Auto a notice of deficiency,
Wang reacted by applying for administrative reconsideration. 313 The
reconsideration body nullified the local STB’s assessment of deficiency,
citing insufficient consideration of all relevant evidence.314 After amending
its calculation, the local STB sent Nanyang Auto another deficiency letter,
which was then upheld by the reconsideration body. Nanyang Auto,
controlled by Wang,315 then filed an administrative lawsuit against the local
STB.316 When the trial court rendered a decision that was not entirely in its
favor, Nanyang Auto appealed.317 The appellate court sent the case back for
retrial.318
Upon retrial of this tax-related administrative case, the court
conducted a thorough analysis of relevant facts and laws. 319 Of the five
major issues disputed between the two parties, the focus was on two issues:
1) whether the local STB could determine tax deficiency based on
transaction slips bearing the signatures of Nanyang Auto staff and
2) whether the penalties levied were legal in procedure. 320 The court
rendered a judgment that appeared to be only partially favorable to the
plaintiff in that the court upheld three STB decisions. 321 However, the
plaintiff was actually victorious because the court sided with Nanyang Auto
on the two major issues.322 The court approved the trial court adjudicatory
committee’s judgment, indicating an exercise of caution.323

权纠纷一案二审民事裁定书) [Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Service Ltd. v. Jiang Sujian], (Nanyang
Intermediate Ct. 2011) (on file with author); Wangguihua Su Nanyang Shi Gongan Ju Wan Cheng Fenju
Bufu Xingzheng Chufa Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (王贵华诉南阳市公安局宛城分局不服行政处
罚 一 案 一 审 行 政 判 决 书 ) [Wang Guihua v. Nanyang Public Security Bureau Wancheng Branch],
(Nanyang City Wancheng District Ct. 2010) (on file with author).
313
Yuangao Shanghai Dazhong Qiche Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Bufu Beigao
Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Xingzheng Zhengshou Chufa Yi An De Yishen Xingzheng
Panjueshu (原告上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司不服被告南阳市国家税务局税务行政征收处罚
一案的一审行政判决书) [Plaintiff Shanghai Volkswagen Sales & Service Co., Ltd. Nanyang Nanyang
City, State Revenue Against the Defendant Tax Administrative Penalties Levied a Case of First Instance
Administrative Judgments], (Henan Provincial High Ct. 2009) (on file with author).
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id.
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Id.
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Unlike the defendant tax agency in Liu & Yang, the STB appealed the
decision in Nanyang Auto.324 The practice of signing slips was common in
the auto service industry and the slips were often the only written evidence
of a transaction.325 If the trial court decision was upheld, the SATs would
inevitably incur significant costs in proving underreported revenues by auto
service providers. The appellate court reversed the trial court decision over
the validity of the evidence used by the STB.326 Nanyang Auto, however,
was relieved from any penalty for underpaying taxes. 327 The reason for
nullifying the penalty was completely procedural. The penalty was nullified
because it was not delivered with a notice of the taxpayer’s right to a
hearing.328
This is in strong contrast to other judgments pertaining to issues about
procedural legality. In cases where plaintiffs pointed out defendant tax
agencies’ procedural flaws in carrying out their duties, the court either
bypassed the issues or treated them as innocuous. 329 Yet in a case where a
politically-connected plaintiff had abundant litigation experiences, support
from within the state, and resources to distribute, procedural issues were
crucial.
E.

High Transaction Costs

Settlement may also be unattainable if the substantial interests of a
third party are involved in a dispute and its resolution is a zero-sum game
between the taxpayer and the third party. Such situations have a much
higher transaction cost for negotiating a settlement.
324
Shangsu Ren Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yin Yishen Yuangao Shanghai Dazhong Qiche
Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Su Yishen Beigao Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu
Xingzheng Chuli Chufa Jiufen Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu (上诉人南阳市国家税务局因一审原
告上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司诉一审被告南阳市国家税务局税务行政处理、处罚纠纷一案
二审行政判决书) [Nanyang STB v. Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Sales and Service Ltd.], (Henan
Nanyang Intermediate Ct. 2009) (on file with author).
325
Id.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
See, e.g., Zhengshou Bo Yu Youse Jinshu Luliao Youxian Gongsi Yu Zhengzhou Shi Zhongyuan

Qu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yi An (郑州博宇有色金属炉料有限公司与郑州市中原区国家税务局一案)
[Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd. v. Zhengzhou Zhongyuan District STB], (2009) (on file with author); Xinxiang Shi
Yun Gong Mao Youxian Gongsi Bufu Beigao wei Hui Shi Difang Shuiwu Ju Wei Dishui Fa (2009) 005
hao “Shuiwu xingzheng chufa Jueding Shu” Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (新乡市运工贸有限公司不服
被告卫辉市地方税务局卫地税罚（2009）005 号《税务行政处罚决定书》和卫地税罚（2010）005
号《税务行政处罚决定书》一审行政判决书) [Xinxiang Yungongmao Ltd. v. Weihui City LTB Re
(2009) 005 and (2010) 005 Punishment], (Henan Weihui City Ct. 2011) (on file with author).
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In Wang v. Zhengzhou 27 District STB Investigation Bureau, a
professional whistleblower reported tax evasion of an electronics store and
disagreed with the subsequent taxes and penalties imposed by the defendant
tax agency.330 The court granted the defendant tax agency’s motion to join
the electronic store as a third party in the case.331 The store management had
significant stakes in trying the case because the same commercial practice
had been reported by other whistleblowers.332 The high transaction costs for
settling a case involving third parties with high stakes in going to trial
diminished the chance of a negotiated settlement.
Another example of high transaction costs preventing settlement is
Hengxin Real Estate Development Ltd. v. Jiyuan LBT, in which the plaintiff
entered into a contract with two other parties (individual A and company A,
where individual A is 99% shareholder of company A) to invest in a real
estate development project. 333 In exchange for the plaintiff’s capital
investment, individual A agreed to cede control of company A to the
plaintiff. 334 Upon closing, the plaintiff received possession of all the
company seals, licenses, and registrations.335 Not long after the deal, the
partnership broke and the plaintiff ceased its investment. 336 In order to
regain control, Company A published an advertisement in a local newspaper
claiming that it had lost the company’s seals and registration documents.337
The publication was a necessary precondition for the company to obtain new
registrations.338 Alerted by the advertisement, the plaintiff reported to the
defendant LBT its possession of the registration and requested that the
agency not issue new registration documents to company A.339 The agency
allegedly agreed to investigate.340 However, when company A applied for
330

Yuangao Wangpenghui Su Beigao Zhengzhou Shi erqi Qu Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Shuiwu
Xingzheng Chuli Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Wenshu (原告王朋辉诉被告郑州市二七区国家税务局稽查
局税务行政处理一案一审行政文书) [Wang v. Zhengzhou 27 District STB Investigation Bureau], (Henan
Zhengzhou 27 District Ct. 2011) (on file with author).
331
Id.
332
Jiaguoqiang Su Henan Sheng Guojia Shuiwu Ju Bufu Fuyi Jueding Yi An Yishen Xingzheng
Panjueshu (贾国强诉河南省国家税务局不服复议决定一案一审行政判决书) [Jia v. Henan Provincial
STB], ( Henan Zhengzhou Jinshui District Ct. 2011) (on file with author).
333
Yuangao XinXiang Shi Hengxin Fangdichan Kaifa Youxian Gongsi Su Beigao Jiyuan Shi Difang
Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu Dengji Banfa Zhengzhao Yi An Yishen Xingzheng Panjueshu (原告新乡市恒信房地产
开发有限公司诉被告济源市地方税务局税务登记颁发证照一案一审行政判决书) [Xinxiang City
Hengxin Real Estate Development Ltd. v. Jiyuan LTB], (Henan Jiyuan Ct. 2011) (on file with author).
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
Id.
338
Id.
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new registration, the agency not only approved it but also allowed changes
to the corporate registration that nullified the initial contract between the
plaintiff and company A.341
The plaintiff sued the LBT for approving the registration changes and
asked the court to revoke the new registration.342 The court ruled against the
plaintiff, noting that the contractual agreement between the plaintiff and the
tax agency was not binding and that the agency did not violate any
procedural or substantive law in approving the registration changes.343 The
plaintiff in this case was located in a different city from the LTB and the
failed investment was its one-time interaction with the defendant’s
jurisdiction. 344 Therefore, it was unlikely that the defendant LTB would
retaliate against the plaintiff. A trial was probably the only viable option
given that the action concerned a third party (company A), substantial
interests were at stake, and the zero-sum nature of the dispute. Furthermore,
real estate developers command substantial political and economic
resources, enabling them to hire counsel and mount legal challenges to local
government officials.
In sum, the substantive survey of the tax-related administrative
lawsuits in Henan Province from 2009 to 2011 illustrates the major reasons
behind a complainant’s decision to go to trial. The cases show a strong
judicial bias favoring the tax agencies that, coupled with the high costs of
agency retaliation, explains the acute reluctance to sue tax agencies in China.
However, if a party can prevent or evade the retaliation, litigation may be a
preferred option when substantial interests are at stake and other channels
prove costly or unavailable. Because of the limits to a tax agency’s power
and discretion, such defense to retaliation may exist in situations where the
complainant expects no future interaction with the agency, owns little
taxable income or assets in the agency’s jurisdiction, or has powerful allies
in the political system. In addition, even when a party is not resistant to
retaliation, a damaged relationship with tax agencies can lead to litigation if
high stakes are involved. In that case, the hostility has shut down nonjudicial channels to resolve conflicts, and litigation adds little extra costs for
the complainant. Moreover, general factors from conventional trial selection
theories, such as high transaction costs and disputants’ optimism, apply as
well. The cases analyzed in this part substantiate these arguments and
illustrate how the theoretical factors work in different factual settings.
341
342
343
344

Id.
Id.
Id.
The Plaintiff is registered in Xinxiang City and the defendant’s jurisdiction is in Jiyuan City.
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VII. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH
This part briefly discusses the contributions of this study to three
literatures: tax administration in China, administrative litigation in China,
and the selection of cases for trial.
A.

Tax Administration in China

Professor Cui points out that the current tax administration in China
operates on a feeble legal basis. Taxpayers in general prefer interacting with
tax agents to obtain information about tax law compliance and enforcement,
and few go to court to resolve disputes.345 As noted earlier, a mere 405
lawsuits were filed in 2011 against tax agencies in all of China.346 Even
fewer cases were filed in 2009 and 2010—293 and 398 respectively. 347
Furthermore, plaintiffs withdrew most of the lawsuits. This study offers a
few explanations for the general reliance by Chinese taxpayers on informal
institutions, such as personal interactions with tax agents, instead of courts,
for tax compliance and dispute resolution in China, and the difficulties for
the two paths to converge.
For reasons listed below, current interactions between taxpayers, tax
agents and the courts reflect an equilibrium that resists swift changes. The
equilibrium is conditioned on: 1) taxpayers failing to comply with tax laws
and regulations, 2) tax agents enjoying great flexibility in administration and
facing low risk of punishment for abusing their discretion, and 3) courts
enforcing the law loosely and with strong bias in favor of the tax agents.
Several structural factors determine the quasi-legal equilibrium for taxation
in China.
First, from a taxpayer’s perspective, full compliance with Chinese tax
law is costly due to conflicting and ambiguous legal authorities (e.g., Liu &
Yang and Nanyang Auto), gaps between business practice and what is
required by the law (e.g., Nanyang Auto and Zhoukou Huilin), and high
formal tax burdens. As noted by a local tax agent, “most companies would
go under if they had to pay all the taxes required by law.”348 Moreover, tax
evasion is pervasive.349
345

See Wei Cui, supra note 37.
See SUMMARY OF FIRST INSTANCE ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS IN CHINA, supra note 4.
347
See Haibo He, supra note 9.
348
See Qian Wang & Xuena Li, supra note 65.
349
Jinyan Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Canadian
GAAR, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 655, 683 (2010).
346
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From the angle of tax agents, on the other hand, wide discretion is
necessary for tax administration because of their multiple concerns with
local business development, meeting revenue targets, personal connections
with the taxpayers, and rampant tax evasion. Exercising this discretion often
results in lax enforcement or violations of the law.350
Meanwhile, when balancing noncompliance by taxpayers and
violations of law by tax agents, weak Chinese courts easily side with the
latter, finding their violations minor and innocuous or completely
sidestepping the issues (e.g., Zhengzhou Boyu Ltd.). In addition, the gap
between business practices in China that de-emphasize formality on the one
hand and the formal evidentiary, and procedural rules required for litigation
on the other, curbs the role of the courts and provides reluctant judges with
easy exits from adjudicating difficult administrative lawsuits (e.g., Zhoukou
Huilin).
As illustrated by the trivial number of tax-related administrative
lawsuits filed each year, tax administration and dispute resolution are quite
stable. If a shift to a law-based equilibrium is considered a desirable policy
goal, the state should coordinate changes to all the three parties and the
institutional contexts in which they act, including: 1) a reduction of formal
tax burdens and clarification of legal authorities that will reduce compliance
costs for taxpayers, 2) preventing post-litigation retaliation by tax
agencies, 351 and 3) encouraging judicial activism and independence in
deciding administrative cases.
Though the equilibrium is stable, this study nonetheless suggests that
certain institutional conditions will nudge China towards a more laworiented society. As illustrated by the contrast between the Liu & Yang case
and the Zhoukou Huilin case,352 private Chinese companies can lower their
risks by conducting business in compliance with basic laws and regulations,
350
Wang Xiang-kun, Wǒguó shuìwù zhífǎ zhōng cúnzài de wèntí jí duìcè yánjiū (我国税务执法中存
在的问题及对策研究) [Enforcement of Tax Problems and Countermeasures: Research on Problems and
Countermeasures in China Tax Administration], CHINA LAW INFO, http://www.cftl.cn/show.asp?a_id=6861
(last visited October 14, 2013).
351
Plaintiffs in any tax-related administrative lawsuits should receive heightened protection from
abuse of power by defendant tax agencies and their related parties. For instance, if a taxpayer sues a LTB
and the case is fully adjudicated at the taxpayer’s insistence, the law should require any non-random audits
of the taxpayer in the following two years to be pre-approved by an independent review body.
352
See Yuanshen Yuangao Liuyongjian, Yang Feng Su Yuanshen Beigao Guangshan Xian Caizheng
Ju Shuiwu Zhengshou Xingzheng Jiufen Yi An, (原审原告刘永建、杨锋诉原审被告光山县财政局税务
征收行政纠纷一案) [Liu & Yang v. Guangshan County Finance Department-Retrial], (Henan Guangshan
County Ct. 2010) (on file with author). The taxpayers obtained its business opportunity through public
bidding and were able to prevail in a suit against local government upon retrial. In comparison, the plaintiff
in Zhoukou Huilin did not comply with the legal procedure in obtaining business and found the law against
him.
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especially if the companies expect to operate long-term and face
unpredictable political support. As the Chinese economic structure
transforms and more business entities adopt a long-term time trajectory, law
will play a more important role in corporate transactions and business
interactions.
One may wonder what is holding the tax agents back from excessive
predatory acts, given their wide discretionary authority and the lack of
political accountability and judicial supervision. As noted earlier, hierarchy
and second-party monitoring institutions play certain role in restraining the
tax agents. An equally important factor is the regional competition for
investments and local leaders’ efforts in generating growth, which is critical
to their career prospect.353 Due to page limit and the focus of this study, this
article will not expand on the discussion. Suffice it to say that empirical
evidence from this study clearly suggests that the Chinese judiciary plays, at
most, a marginal role in facilitating tax administration in accordance with
the law.
B.

Administrative Litigation in China

This study also contributes to the literature on administrative litigation
in China by adding new empirical evidence about the dynamics of suing
powerful tax agencies. First, an interesting common feature of the court
decisions and judgments analyzed in this article is the engagement of legal
counsel by defendant tax agencies. As noted earlier, defendant government
agencies hire lawyers more frequently than the plaintiffs. With state
agencies being their major clients, administrative law attorneys, when
representing the plaintiffs, cannot constantly be zealous guards of their
client’s legal interests, and may persuade the plaintiffs to settle even when a
trial would be more beneficial. Moreover, even though legal representation
may be responsible for more sophisticated judicial deliberation, it does not
appear to have significantly improved plaintiffs’ chances of winning.354
In addition, the study finds certain groups to be exposed to a smaller
risk of extra-judicial agency retaliation, which is crucial to judicial
resolution of grievances against government officials in China. First, there
353
SUSAN H. WHITING, THE CADRE EVALUATION SYSTEM AT THE GRASS ROOTS: THE PARADOX OF
PARTY RULE, IN HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER: DIVERSITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE POST-DENG
ERA (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004).
354
See Ji Li, supra note 9, at 31. The marginal role and effect of lawyers in representing the plaintiffs’
interests is consistent with an earlier empirical study finding that lawyer density has negative impact on the
rate of administrative lawsuits in China. However, such a conclusion should be viewed with caution
because tried cases differ systemically from the settled ones.
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appears to be an emerging group of urban residents, professional
whistleblowers, who frequently use the judiciary for personal gain.
Compared to an average Chinese, they file significantly more administrative
lawsuits. 355 The cases analyzed in this article suggest that such profitmotivated administrative litigation may have some positive effects on
rationalizing local governance. However, because lawsuits filed by the
whistleblowers are driven mainly by profits, their subject matter is limited to
disclosure of government-held information critical to the calculation of their
rewards. None of the lawsuits will likely lead to more judicial oversight of
powerful state agencies when their core interests are at stake.
Immunity to agency retaliation may also come from limited future
interaction. Both high population mobility and agency specialization create
more one-time interactions between residents and a specific agency.
Therefore, we will likely observe a growing number of administrative
lawsuits as a result of the economic development and accelerating
urbanization in China.
Parties to disputes with government officials may also be relatively
immune to extra-judicial retaliation if they have ample political resources.356
Though local courts exhibit strong judicial bias in favor of defendant state
agencies, they face heightened pressure to be impartial when the plaintiffs
have powerful allies within the political system. In such situations, judges
will often stay close to the law to mitigate the risk of being punished posttrial by the losing party. For this reason, decentralization of political power
will provide a more benign environment for the adjudication of
administrative lawsuits.
C.

The Trial Selection Theories

The findings of this study also contribute to the literature on the
selection of cases for trial. As noted earlier, the Priest/Klein model predicts
a central tendency for the plaintiffs to achieve a win rate of 50% in tried
cases, and that most tried cases are “close cases.” The asymmetric
355

Renleliang Su Zhengzhou Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Jicha Ju Buluxing Fading Zhize Yi An Yishen
Xingzheng Panjueshu (任乐亮诉郑州市国家税务局稽查局不履行法定职责一案一审行政判决书) [Ren
v. Zhengzhou STB Investigation Bureau], (Henan Zhengzhou 27 District Ct. 2012) (on file with author).
356
Shangsu Ren Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Yin Yishen Yuangao Shanghai Dazhong Qiche
Nanyang Xiaoshou Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Su Yishen Beigao Nanyang Shi Guojia Shuiwu Ju Shuiwu
Xingzheng Chuli Chufa Jiufen Yi An Ershen Xingzheng Panjueshu (上诉人南阳市国家税务局因一审原
告上海大众汽车南阳销售服务有限公司诉一审被告南阳市国家税务局税务行政处理、处罚纠纷一案
二审行政判决书) [Nanyang STB v. Shanghai Dazhong Auto Nanyang Sales and Service Ltd.], (Henan
Nanyang Intermediate Ct. 2009) (on file with author).
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information theory, in contrast, predicts that only cases where the informed
defendant expects to prevail will go to trial. The empirical findings of this
study, though limited by the small sample size and possible missing cases,
are consistent with the asymmetric information theory. In addition, the
asymmetric information model better reflects the real world situation in
China.
Though the asymmetric information theory predicts a win rate that
approximates the empirical finding of this article, the interpretation of the
logic has to be adjusted to the context of Chinese judicial politics. The
original model implicitly treats the court’s decision standard, even if biased,
as an exogenous factor against which the parties apply their facts.357 When
applied to administrative lawsuits in China, however, the model should
incorporate the fact that the decision standard is often a variable of the
power balance between the two parties. So instead of the informed
defendant knowing the cases he will win and selecting them for trial as
prescribed by the original model, the defendant government officials in
China, when sued, may refuse to settle for various non-judicial reasons and
then press the local court to render them a favorable verdict. In other words,
existing models based on litigation experiences in the United States or other
countries with an independent judiciary are over-simplified and insufficient
if applied directly to the Chinese context or the context of another country
with a dependent judiciary, such as Vietnam.358 In addition to asymmetric
information, the model should incorporate asymmetric political power
between the disputants to be a more useful analytical tool for research on
trial selection in China.359
VIII. CONCLUSION
By reviewing all tax-related administrative lawsuits in Henan from
2009 to 2011, this study unveils a few reasons for the puzzling persistence of
357
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. OF ECON.
404, 406 (1984).
358
An empirical study of selected civil cases in China also finds inconsistencies with the Priest/Klein
prediction. See Yingmao Tang & Liugang Sheng, 中国司法执行难的计量分析” [A Quantitative Study of
the Difficulties in the Enforcement of Court Judgment in China], 4 法律和社会科学[LAW AND SOC. SCI.]
1(2011).
359
While such efforts by the SCP and regional high courts to publish court decisions are
commendable, it should be made clear that tried cases are not a representative sample of all lawsuits. For
lawsuits against government officials, the high win rate for the defendants renders the disclosure of court
decisions less useful as clarification of ambiguities and conflicts in legal authorities, deterrence for future
violations by defendant agencies, or encouragement for more administrative lawsuits. To achieve such
policy goals, settled cases need also be disclosed to the public.
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some lawsuits against powerful agencies in China. Individuals and
companies with limited extractable resources, powerful allies in government,
and substantial stake in litigation are more inclined to sue, especially when
transaction costs of alternative resolution are high.
This article adopts an institutional rational choice approach, taking
into consideration the political and legal contexts in exploring how Chinese
resolve their disputes against powerful state agencies. This approach has its
obvious limitations. For instance, not all aggrieved parties sue for material
interests. An earlier study suggested that some plaintiffs in China will invest
much more in an administrative lawsuit than they expect to receive if
prevail.360 Several of the disclosed lawsuits against tax agencies also suggest
factors beyond expected costs and benefits in the persistence to sue.
In Li v. Luohe STB, for example, the plaintiff litigated repeatedly at
the trial and appellate level against local STB bureau for an insubstantial
amount of vehicle tax. 361 After the appellate court upheld the trial court
decision,362 the plaintiff filed another complaint over the same dispute, with
slightly different wording.363 The trial court refused to docket the case. The
plaintiff, instead of accepting the ruling and paying the deficiency, appealed
the decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial court holding yet again.
The tax deficiency could hardly justify the efforts by the plaintiff.
In addition to the limitations of the theoretical approach, the small size
and the regional restriction of the sample cases caution broad and definitive
conclusions. Though the cases analyzed in the article should represent the
pool of tried administrative lawsuits against tax agencies in Henan Province,
it is possible that omissions and errors in publishing the court decisions and
judgments will cause biases in the sample, especially if the omissions are
systematic, e.g., judgments against tax agencies were excluded. But even if
the biases lower the plaintiffs’ win-rates, the rate for the unbiased sample
will probably remain low given the current basis of zero.

360

Qinghua Wang, supra note 9, at 532.
Lijunan Su Luohe Shi Guoshui Ju Xingzheng Bu Zuowei Shangsu Yi An Ershen Xingzheng
Caiding Shu (李军安诉漯河市国税局行政不作为上诉一案二审行政裁定书) [Li v. Luohe STB-Appeal],
Luohe City Intermediate Ct. 2009) (on file with author).
362
Lijūn'ān su luòhé shì guóshuì jú xíngzhèng bù zuòwéi shàngsù yī àn èrshěn xíngzhèng cáidìng shū
(李军安诉漯河市国税局行政不作为上诉一案二审行政裁定书) [Li v. Luohe STB Appeal], (Luohe City
Intermediate Court) (on file with author).
363
Lijunan Bufu Yan Chengqu Renmin Fayuan (2011) Yan Xing Chu Zi di 38 Hao Bu Yu Shouli
361
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In comparison, extending the findings to other provinces may be more
problematic. Though Henan Province is arguably representative of China in
many aspects, such as its population size, there remains significant regional
variation in administrative litigation.364 Once other provincial high courts
begin to implement the SPC policies on judgment disclosure, more crossregional data will be available, the study of which should make the findings
of this study more robust to various regional differences. Furthermore, the
arguments presented in this study will be greatly strengthened if they can be
evaluated against cases where parties opt not to sue tax agencies even
though all the conditions described above are satisfied.
In spite of these limitations, the study presents a comprehensive and
in-depth analysis of a relatively unbiased sample of administrative cases
against a powerful agency in China. Theories derived from the study should
be applicable to administrative litigation in other areas. Factors that enable
Chinese citizens to sue a powerful agency should have even strong effects
on lawsuits against less powerful ones. For instance, it should not be a
surprise to find professional whistleblowers sue an environmental protection
agency (a weak government agency) in China for information disclosure or
nonfeasance, if their income depends on the disputed agency performance.
The findings of this study make valuable contributions to our knowledge
about tax administration, administrative litigation and trial selection in the
Chinese context.

364

See Ji Li, supra note 9, at 12.

